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Abstract 
The microfinance sector has been going through profound changes in the last decades: It evolved from a 
donor-based  community,  driven  by  philanthropic  objectives,  to  a  high  growth  market  that  is  today 
attracting commercial investors who seek social impact and a competitive risk-adjusted return. However, 
recent discussions in the sector about the assumed financial strength and resistance of microfinance 
institutions further triggered by the impact of the global economic and financial crisis on the microfinance 
sector as well as the increasing criticism about irresponsible business practices and limited impact on 
poverty reduction led to the question if the sector continues to evolve into a mainstream asset class. On 
the one hand the integration of microfinance institutions (MFI) into capital markets makes investments in 
the sector more attractive for mainstream investors, as the management of the investments turns more 
professional. On the other hand the correlation of the performance of MFIs with local and global market 
movements increases and makes diversification of an investor’s portfolio less likely.  
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1  Introduction 
Since the 1990s microfinance evolved from a former donor and NGO driven sector into a self-sustainable 
or even profitable industry. Enthusiasm spread wide that the commercialisation of microfinance would 
attract mainstream investors enabling high numbers of microfinance institutions (MFIs) to further grow 
and  reach  larger  parts  of  the  world’s  poor  –  independent  of  restricted  donor  money.  This  financial 
inclusion  would  help  the  poor  to  lift  themselves  out  of  poverty  and  furthermore  enhance  wider 
developmental effects, being it economic effects e.g. through labour markets or social effects e.g. through 
the empowerment of female clients. 
The observable growing demand for private social responsible investment seeking a double-bottom-line 
(financial  returns  and  a  positive  social  impact)  turned  microfinance  into  a  particularly  interesting 
investment opportunity. At the same time, microfinance was seen as resistant to economic shocks and 
uncoupled from movements in international financial markets. Furthermore, historical low default rates 
and good portfolio quality somehow cultivated the belief that microfinance was a low-risk business  which 
offered portfolio diversification effects and hence was even attractive for purely commercially oriented 
investors..  However,  for  being  attractive  for  mainstream  investors  as  an  “asset  class”,  microfinance 
investments have to fullfill certain criteria and the market has to offer the prospect of being able to 
absorb high investment volumes. 
 
To answer the question if microfinance will (continue to) evolve into a mainstream asset class we will 
therefore address a set of different aspects. First of all we will turn to the definition of an asset class and 
analyse whether microfinance can be defined as such or not. Furthermore we seek to know: Will the 
readiness  of  (mainstream)  investors  to  invest  in  microfinance  increase  in  the  future?  And  will  the 
absorption capacity of microfinance institutions keep up with the increasing investor’s appetite?  
 
To answer these major questions the paper is structured as follows: 
 
In a fist part we provide an introduction into the composition, volumes and directions of international 
microfinance investments also identifying the most important players and finance mechanisms.  
Then, in order to find out what matters in modern portfolio theory and if microfinance fits into this 
concepts part two discusses the concept of an asset class. As microfinance investors are interested in 
dual returns (financial and social) we furthermore discuss the level of financial returns reached by 
microfinance investments. Afterwards, we turn to the assessment of risks related to microfinance. In 
the category of financial risks we distinguish between systematic and specific risk while we refer to 
reputational risks when it comes to the social performance of MFIs. Assuming that it is required for 
an evolving asset class that considerable volumes can be invested we then assess the ability of 
current vehicles to channel mainstream investments. Finally, we assess the market size and business 
environments in microfinance in order to identify current and future investment opportunities.  
 
Our analysis of the second part is based on the results of a survey among 60 Microfinance Investment 
Vehicles  (MIVs)  conducted by  the  authors  of  this  study  in  February  2009.  MIVs  channel  the  bulk  of 
microfinance investments to MFIs. The 24 MIVs who responded account roughly for USD 2,7 billion assets 
under management, which is 57% of all MIVs’ assets under management in 2007. Commercial investment       3 
   
vehicles  as  Blue  Orchard  as  well  as  more  socially  oriented  vehicles  as  Oikocredit  were  among  the 
participants. The survey was designed to, firstly, collect opinions of microfinance experts on obstacles and 
opportunities for private microfinance investments in the past and in the future. Secondly, it aimed at 
assessing the role of microfinance as an asset class and as a socially responsible investment. The survey 
was  directed  to  MIVs,  listed  as  private  investors  in  the  online  database  MIX  Market  (Microfinance 
Information  Exchanfe;  The  MIX).  Excluded  were  those  vehicles  exclusively  funded  by  donations,  for 
example the Hivos Triodos Fund or Omydiar Network. We align this with the results of a series of other 
surveys conducted within the industry such as a survey among European pension funds conducted by the 
World Microfinance Forum Geneva (2009), the “Banana Skins” reports realized by Centre for the Study of 
Financial Innovation (2008; CSFI 2009; CSFI 2010) as well as a survey conducted by the International 
Association of Microfinance Investors (Abrams 2009) about defaults of MFIs. Furthermore we interpret 
quantitative data from The MIX
2 whenever we aim to further analyze certain observations, especially 
regarding the microfinance market and related statements of survey participants. Practitioners’ reports as 
well academic studies will be consulted to deepen the argumentation. 
To illustrate the developed arguments with a concrete example we refer to the case of Peru in part three. 
Peru is considered to have one of the most developed microfinance markets and thus, is an important 
target for international investments. The basis of the analysis is a series of 45 qualitative interviews of 
different stakeholders conducted between February and March 2010, among them representatives of the 
regulatory bodies for the banking sector and the stock exchange, five rating agencies (two specialized and 
three mainstream) foreign investors with offices in Lima, one commercial bank (Banco de Credito), two 
governmental banks (COFIDE, Banco de la Nación) and a total of 19 MFIs with different legal forms (1 
bank, 2 finance companies, 4 CMACs, 2 CRACs, 3 EDPYMEs, 2 cooperatives and 5 NGOs)
3. Results of these 
interviews together with some quantitative data, audited financial statements from single MFIs as well as 
sector reports shall bring further insights into the topics elaborated in the previous sections.  
2  Growth of International Investments in Microfinance 
To facilitate the placement of the argumentation in favour and against microfinance’s development into a 
mainstream asset class, this section provides an overview on the evolution of international microfinance 
investments since 2004.  
Assets under management (AUM) of Microfinance Investment Vehicles increased from around  
USD 1 billion in 2004 to USD 6,6 Billion in 2008.
4 MIVs are intermediary sources which channel the bulk of 
international  microfinance  investments  to  microfinance  institutions.  Total  international  microfinance 
investments,  which  comprises  indirect  investment  through  MIVs  and  direct  investments  of  primary 
                                                           
2 An often cited critique for using data from The MIX is the fact, that data from MFIs is self-reported and that little controls 
are in place in order to verify the data. Thus, these numbers have to be interpreted with caution. Still, it shall be considerate 
adequate to use the data in order to give a broad, general overview. Furthermore as more and more MFIs report to The 
MIX from single sectors/countries knowing each other the possibility to cheat diminishes. For instance, in Peru almost all 
MFIs also upload their financial statements and rating reports so that wrong information can be easily tracked. Another 
critique is that The Mix does not reflect the whole worldwide microfinance sector as a lot of MFIs might simply not want to 
share their data. Still, for the purpose of this study, considering the MFIs reporting to the MIX seems reasonable as MFIs 
reporting voluntarily to this information exchange platform are probably those seeking international funding, and thus 
attach importance to international visibility, which nowadays only The MIX provides. 
3 Please note that the interviews were realized during the research for one of the author’s doctoral thesis about ratings in 
the context of microfinance. The results presented in this study are based on the first insights right after having realized the 
interviews and are not based on profound analysis of the latter.  
4 Since 2007 CGAP regularly conducts an MIV Survey which comprises 80 MIVs. The facts presented in this part are based 
on the CGAP MIV Surveys 2006 – 2008.       4 
   
Source: Own diagram, data taken from Reille, Forster (2008), 
CGAP (2008a), CGAP (August 2009)  
investors into MFIs, reached USD 10 billion in December 2008 (CGAP 2009d). As MIVs present the main 
instrument for international microfinance investments they will be in the focus of this analysis. MIVs can 
be self-managed or work with external fund managers and fund advisors. Most MIVs are set up as a SICAV 
(Société  d'Investissement  à  Capital  Variable)  which  is  an  open-end  investment  vehicle  registered  in 
Luxembourg. They are investment entities that have a clear focus on microfinance and receive funds from 
primary investors through the issuance 
of  shares,  units,  bonds,  or  other 
financial instruments (CGAP 2008b).  
The number of MIVs grew from 38 in 
2004 to 103 in 2008. Average MIV asset 
sizes  also  increased  significantly  from 
USD 20 million in 2004 to USD 161, 2 
million  in  2008.
5  In  2008,  the  growth 
slowed  down:  While  assets  under 
management increased on average by 
71%  from  2005  to  2007,  MIVs  grew 
only  by  31%  in  2008.  Compared  to 
other  asset  markets,  such  as  the 
market  for  socially  responsible 
investments (SRI), the asset growth of 
MIVs since 2004 is impressive
6. To identify the main drivers of the boom we first analyze the level of 
primary investors and secondly the level of investment vehicles. We find that institutional investors and 
commercial investment vehicles, as registered mutual funds and structured finance vehicles, contributed 
most significantly to investment growth. The following graph gives an overview on investments flows and 
main actors which are explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
Institutional investors are main drivers of investment growth 
  
Private institutional investors’ share of MIV’s AUM has increased from 14% in 2005 to 43% in 2008, 
whereas  the  share  of  individual  investors,  including  retail  investors  and  High  Net  Worth  Individuals 
(HNWI), and public investors, so called Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), has decreased.  
                                                           
5 Average MIV size refers to the participants of the CGAP survey (54 participants).  
6 The SRI markets grew from 2,7 trillion in 2003 to over USD 4 trillion assets under management in 2007, see Reille, X. and S. Forster 
(2008). Foreign Capital. Investment in Microfinance. Balancing Social and Financial Returns,  Washington D.C., CGAP. 
       5 
   
Source: Own diagram, data taken from Reille, Forster (2008), CGAP 
(2008a), CGAP (August 2009) 
Source: Own elaboration, adapted from (Reille and Forster 2008, p.2) 
Source: Own elaboration, adapted from (CGAP 2009b) 
Microfinance Investment Flows 
Examples of private institutional investors are international commercial banks, global investment banks, 
insurance companies and pension funds, as well as emerging markets private equity investors. A large 
number of international banks, from ABN Amro MV, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank over ING Group MV to 
Societé Generale are involved in microfinance (Boúúaert 2008, p.4). International banks’ activities are 
very  broad:  They  include  investments 
into  MIVs,  retail  and  wholesale  loans, 
guarantees, technical assistance, equity 
stakes  in  MFIs,  and  the  management 
and  structuring  of  new  MIVs  (Crijns, 
Lansbergen  et  al.  2006,  p.  60).  The 
involvement  of  pension  funds  is  a  novelty  in  the 
microfinance  world.  For  instance  in 
2006  TIAA-CREF,  a  mainstream  asset 
manager,  made  a  USD  40  million 
investment  in  Developing  World 
Markets Microfinance Equity Fund I and 
created  a USD 100 million Global Microfinance 
Investment  Program  (GMIP)  within  its 
SRI allocation. The pension fund is also 
holding a USD 43 million private equity 
stake in ProCredit Holding AG (N.N. 2009). Private equity investors focused on emerging markets (such as 
Sequoia Capital, the Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group and the Dubai based firm Legatum) have invested in 
MFIs’ equity (Reille and Forster 2008). In November 2008, the Indian MFI SKS Microfinance has raised 
direct  investments  of  USD  75  million  from  the  investors  Sandstone  Capital  and  Kismet  Capital,  both 
mainstream equity funds with an international investor base (SKS 2008). Also insurance companies, such 
as Morley (United Kingdom) and AXA (France) are starting to get interested in microfinance (CGAP 2008a).  
 
Investments of individuals and public investors grow more slowly 
 
  
The share of retail investors in 
total MIV investments actually 
decreased from 47% in 2005 to 
34%  in  2008.  However, 
investments  by  individuals 
increased in absolute numbers 
from  around  USD  800.000 
million  in  2004  to  more  than 
USD  2  billion  in  2008.  Hence, 
their  growth  still  contributed 
considerably to the investment 
boom.  Individual  investors 
include  retail  investors  and 
HNWI. HNWIs are according to       6 
   
Eurosif individuals with more than USD 1 million in financial assets (Eurosif 2008). Retail investors manage 
financial assets less than USD 1 million. The first vehicle targeting retail investors is the cooperative 
society  Oikocredit,  which  issues  shares  of  EUR  200.  Two  vehicles  focused  on  socially  oriented  retail 
investors were founded as cooperative societies in the 1990s in the Netherlands (Incofin in 1992, Alterfin 
in 1994). The Calvert Social Investment Foundation entered the microfinance market in 1995 by issuing 
Community Investment Notes to the general public in the United States. A major turning point was the 
foundation of the Dexia Microcredit Fund in 1998. This vehicle was the first registered mutual fund and 
the first which aimed at financial returns, while promoting actively its “double bottom line” character. 
Two important mutual funds targeting retail investors were opened to retail investors in 2000 and 2002: 
The ASN Novib Fund, founded by the bank ASN, and Oxfam Novib Triodos Fair Share Fund, initiated by the 
Triodos Bank in the Netherlands. These vehicles were followed by ResponsAbility Global Microfinance 
Fund,  set  up  by  three  Suisse  banks  (amongst  them  Credit  Suisse)  in  2003,  which  accepts  minimum 
investments of USD 1.000. Since then the options for retail investors increased, because more mutual 
funds have been entering the market (e.g. Wallberg Fund or Dual Return Microfinance Fund). HNWIs 
constituting the second group of individual investors also engage increasingly in the microfinance scene. 
However, aggregated data about their investment volumes is not available. Examples are Pierre Omidyar, 
the founder of ebay, who invested USD 100 million to establish the Omidyar Tufts Fund in cooperation 
with Tufts university, and Bob Patillo who founded the Gray Ghost Fund. These kinds of funds are often 
funds that invest in other vehicles, e.g. Omidyar Tufts Fund invested in ProCredit Holding AG (ProCredit 
Holding  AG  2009)  and  the  Gray  Ghost  Fund  invests  in  Calvert  Foundation,  Bellwether  Fund,  Acción 
Investments in Microfinance etc. HNWI also engage in structured finance transactions in microfinance: 
They constituted 10% of the first close of Blue Orchards Microfinance Securities I in 2004 (Swanson 2007). 
Public investors are private sector arms of government-owned bilateral and multilateral development 
agencies as defined by CGAP. All Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) accounted for an outstanding 
microfinance portfolio, containing MIV and direct investment, of USD 4.1 billion as of December 2007. 
Main players are the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The KfW has been the initiator 
and  promoter  of  the  European  Fund  for  Southeast  Europe  (EFSE).  The  fund  attracted  besides  DFIs, 
individual and institutional investors as Deutsche Bank, SAL Oppenheim, Omidyar Tufts Microfinance Fund 
and  the  SRI  Fund  “Good  Growth  Fund”  (European  Fund  for  Southeast  Europe  2009). KfW  is  a  main 
shareholder of the ProCredit Holding AG (ProCredit Holding AG 2009) and supported the group since its 
beginning  in  1998.  As  a  reaction  to  the  financial  crisis  in  February  2009  KfW  created  additionally  a 
refinancing facility for microfinance institutions (KfW 2009) in cooperation with IFC. It aims at building a 
total portfolio of USD 500 million by attracting private investors. Furthermore DFIs have provided seed 
capital  for  microfinance  funds,  e.g.  for  PROFUND  and  Lok  Capital  and  helped  to  attract  institutional 
investors to microfinance by purchasing equity and junior tranches of structured finance vehicles. 
 
Funds by commercially oriented asset managers overtake socially focused funds 
 
Looking  at  investment  vehicles,  it  is  notable  that  vehicles  managed  by  commercially  oriented  asset 
managers (registered mutual funds and actively managed structured finance vehicles) outperform long 
established socially focused funds, in terms of absolute portfolio size. From 2006 to 2008 registered 
mutual  funds  grew  by  113,5%.  One  of  the  main  players,  ResponsAbility  Global  Microfinance  Fund, 
increased  its  portfolio  by  98%  in  2008.  The  responsAbility  Microfinance  Leaders  Fund,  focusing  on 
institutional investors, grew by 378% to reach a microfinance portfolio of USD 128 million. The Dexia 
Microcredit  Fund  increased  by  138%  to  reach  USD  255  million.  Structured  finance  vehicles  passively       7 
   
Source: (CGAP 2009b) 
managed  increased  by  86%,  which  can  be  explained  by  the  entrance  of  vehicles  managed  by  Blue 
Orchards S.A. The growth 
of  actively  managed 
structured  finance 
vehicles (83%) was driven 
by  the  growth  of  EFSE 
whose  microfinance 
portfolio  grew  by  71% 
reaching USD 308 million 
in  2007.  Whereas 
average  total  assets  of 
socially focused funds as 
Oikocredit  increased  by 
around  30%  (CGAP 
2008b). The high growth 
rates  can  partly  be 
explained  by  the  age  of 
the vehicles: Registered mutual funds and structured finance vehicles are relatively young compared to 
socially focused funds. They are still in a high growth phase, being on average only 3 years (registered 
mutual funds) and 1,5 years (structured finance vehicles ) in existence. Socially focused funds count in 
contrast on average 12,1 years since inception. The vehicles mentioned above refer to six “peer groups” 
identified  by  CGAP  and  Symbiotics  according  to  business  model,  commercial  orientation,  financial 
instruments and asset classes (equity, fixed income)(CGAP 2008b).  
 
Characteristics of MIV Peer Groups 
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Source: Own elaboration, information taken from (CGAP 2009b) 
 
MIVs maintain strong focus on debt 
Debt has always been the preferred investment type (over 75% end of 2008). The average maturity of 
loans to MFIs is 32 months (CGAP 2009b, p.8) average debt investment size comes to USD 1,8 Million. 
Equity investments are growing faster than debt investment, especially fuelled by India. Equity investment 
plays an increasingly important role, as more MFIs become regulated institutions and need to comply with 
regulatory equity requirements (Reille and Forster 2008, p.13).  For instance, the pension fund TIAA CREF 
holds non-voting preferential shares in ProCredit Holding AG (ProCredit Holding AG 2009). Nevertheless 
equity investors in microfinance still face insufficient valuation of equity participations and a lack of exit 
options  (Goodman  2006)  .  Furthermore  the  number  of  MFIs,  which  are  able  to  undertake  these 
investments, is limited (Reille and Forster 2008).  
Highly concentrated MIV market dominated by a few main players 
The MIV market is dominated by a few players: Top 10 MIVs account for 55% of MIV investments in 2009. 
52%  of  total  MIV  assets  are  managed  by  five  asset  managers.  The  concentration  is  also  very  high 
regarding the investees: MIV investments remain concentrated in a few tier 1 MFIs, with average top five 
investment exposure accounting for 41% of MIV investments. The largest 150 microfinance institutions 
(out of more than 3000 worldwide)
7 account for 86 % of MIV total assets (Reille and Forster 2008). 
Investments are also geographically very concentrated, especially on Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(45% of investments) and Latin America (32% of investments) (CGAP 2008b). However, investment in 
South Asia and Africa is rising, it increased by 164% and 119% from 2006 to 2007. This corresponds to a 
high concentration within the regions: 58% of investments is concentrated on the TOP 5 countries (CGAP 
2009b).  For  example,  half  of  the  investment  of  ResponsAbility  Global  Microfinance  Fund  and  Dexia 
Microcredit  Fund  is  concentrated  on  seven  countries(Blue  Orchard  2010a;  Credit  Suisse  2010).  The 
concentration of structured finance vehicles is even higher: Blue Orchard Loans for Development 1 invests 
half of the portfolio in four countries
8 and Blue Orchard Microfinance Securities 1 invests half of its 
portfolio in three countries
9 (Blue Orchard 2010b). The European Fund for Southeast Europe invested 46% 
in two countries (EFSE 2009). We will refer to this concentration in chapter 3.6.  
 
 
                                                           
7 Please note that it is a difficult to assess the exact number of existing MFIs worldwide. While it is relatively easy to count 
regulated MFIs, unregulated MFIs such as credit unions often operate without the knowledge of public authorities. For 
example, in Mexiko the estimation of existing MFIs until 2006 varied between 388 and 863; please see Kirchstein, K. (2008). 
Institution-Building im mexikanischen Mikrofinanzsektor. Das Beispiel der Cajas Solidarias. Saarbrücken, VDM Verlag Dr. 
Müller. For another exampls of how information can vary please refer to part three of the present study. 
8 Colombia, Peru ,Bolivia, Nicaragua 
9 Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador       9 
   
Top 10 MIVs at the end of 2009 
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Dual Return Fund - Vision 
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2005  EUR  118.8  94.9 
   Total        3628.1  2357.0 
  
 
3  Microfinance – A future mainstream asset class? 
After having assessed the growth and composition of international microfinance investments, we 
now turn to the definition of microfinance as an asset class. In order to evaluate the risk-return 
profile of microfinance investments we furthermore analyze the returns reached by microfinance 
investment vehicles. Regarding the risks we distinguish between financial risks on the one hand and 
reputational risks on the other hand. 
3.1  Track Record and Benchmark  
 “A  perceived  attractive  risk-return  profile  is  not  sufficient,  microfinance  investments  need  to  be 
benchmarked  and  established  as  an  asset  class,  to  become  integrated  in  portfolios  of  commercial 
investors”, as pointed out by De Sousa-Shields and Frankiewiez (2004, p.10). Has that changed in the last 
years? Opinions of experts are wide apart: New funds as Wallberg Fund, Good Growth Fund and Dual 
Return Fund are stressing that microfinance is close to or has already evolved into an asset class (Dual 
Return  Vision  Microfinance  Fund  2009).  Swanson  (Developing  World  Markets,  microfinance  asset 
Source: CGAP (2010)       10 
   
manager), however,  believes that microfinance is far from meeting the requirements to be evaluated as 
an asset class (Swanson 2007, p.13). In 2006, Norbert Kloppenburg (KfW) stated that “ [Microfinance]has 
not yet matured into an asset class that can attract hors of mainstream investors” (Kloppenburg 2006, 
p.5). But change seems to be underway: the 2006 MicroRate MIV Survey is titled “Microfinance – an 
emerging asset class” (MicroRate 2006). Also Merrill Lynch finds that “MFIs are creating an emerging asset 
class of microfinance investment vehicles” (Merrill Lynch 2009). 
Formally, microfinance does not yet meet the characteristics of a mainstream asset class 
In general an asset class is a group of assets that can be clearly differentiated from other assets, regarding 
important financial characteristics (Hockmann and Thießen 2007, p.555). In the process of asset allocation 
of investors, the portfolio is divided into different asset classes to achieve a most efficient diversification 
(Hockmann and Thießen 2007, p. 556). As a first step the differentiating characteristics (risk – return 
profile)  of  an  asset  class  are  derived  from  past  performance  and  result  in  a  track  record  of  the 
performance which can be put in relation to benchmark indices. Common indicators for mainstream 
investors to evaluate the performance are the Jensen's alpha, the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor ratio.  
(Hockmann and Thießen 2007, p. 652). To derive these indicators the returns earned in excess of the risk 
free rate (as treasury bills), the standard deviations of returns over an adequate time period (measuring 
the total risk), and the beta coefficient
10 (measuring the systematic risk) are needed (see chapter 3.3 for 
further details). Looking at the level of MIVs, the performance history is still short. With the exception of 
Oikocredit, established in 1975, and Dexia Microfinance Fund established in 1997, all MIVs were set up 
after 2003. Moreover, the underlying assets of MIVs cannot be evaluated on a marked-to-market basis. As 
mentioned above MIVs invest more than 70% in loans. As will be shown in chapter 3.6 Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) and securitization of MFIs’ portfolios are still few exceptions. Most of the investees are 
private companies, not listed on a regulated stock or market exchange. Therefore these investments are 
non-tradable (with few exceptions) and there does not exist a secondary market (Swanson 2007, p.3). In 
addition,  the  liquidity  of  the  market  is  very  limited.  For  instance,  shares  of  ResponsAbility  Global 
Microfinance Fund can only be liquidated on a quarterly basis. Hence, it is difficult to derive potential 
portfolio diversification effect of microfinance and to compare the performance of the investment to a 
peer group.  
However, there are attempts to assess the track record of microfinance investments. Krauss and Walter 
looked at the level of MFIs and used accounting earnings of MFIs taken from annual reports. The study by 
Galema, Lensink & Spierdijk (2008) uses key performance indicators of MFIs to assess a potential positive 
portfolio diversification effect. Krauss and Walter stress many constraints of this data source (Krauss and 
Walter 2008, p.8) Therefore (Janda and Svarovska 2009) and Marco Deiana (2009) use the Net Asset 
Values (NAVs) of MIVs to evaluate the performance. But the analyzed period is very short (2006 – 2008). 
After having measured the track record, the next challenge is to identify suitable benchmark indices to 
derive the beta factor which is needed to include systematic risk in the assessment of the performance. 
Benchmarking an asset is generally a precondition for conventional investors to adequately assess the 
risk-return profile of an investment and to include it in a portfolio. Mainstream asset classes are normally 
benchmarked to market indices. The cited studies use the S&P 500, MSCI World and MSCI Emerging 
                                                           
10 The beta coefficient is result of a simple regression and gives information on the sensitivity of the returns regarding 
market movements. A fund which performans according to the market shows a beta of 1.0, whereas a fund with a beta 
lower or higher than one, it moves less or more than the market, see Deiana, M. (2009) "Ethical Investments in 
Microfinance Mutual Funds: An Emprirical Analysis."  DOI: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564610.       11 
   
Symbiotics Microfinance Index (SMX) 
Source: CGAP (2010) 
Markets  (and  indeed  find  relatively  low  volatility  and  a  positive  portfolio  diversification  effect  of 
microfinance as explained in chapter 3.3). It is debatable if the track record so far and the degree of 
volatility of MIVs’ NAVs, give mainstream investors enough information about the underlying risk, since 
they are smoothened, as 90 percent of MIVs are charging fixed interest rates and are not subject to daily 
value  changes,  in  contrast  to  stock  and  bond  markets  (CGAP  2009d).  Hence,  to  predict  future 
performance  it  is  important  to  look  more  deeply  into  the  determinants  of  returns  and  risk  of 
microfinance.  
 
Most MIVs and half of interviewed pension funds view microfinance close to a mainstream asset class 
Our MIV survey gives insights into the discussion of microfinance evolving into an asset class. 38% state 
that microfinance can be classified as an asset class and 46 % find that it will be evolving into an asset 
class within the next years. Only 8% object, and 4 % are not sure. The pension funds survey shows that 
50%  of  the  participating  pension  funds  understand  microfinance  investments  as  socially  responsible 
investments  (SRI).  In  this  category  microfinance  investments  do  not  compete  directly  with  other 
mainstream assets. However, the other half categorizes microfinance as a mainstream asset classes for 
fixed income (in emerging market or higher risk subsets) or private equity. Both surveys indicate that 
microfinance is on its way to be understood as a mainstream asset class, even by mainstream investors 
such as pension funds. The track record of microfinance does not seem to be an issue for many MIVs 
anymore (as stated by 46% of participants). Pension funds have a different perception. As they rely on 
MIVs as their main source of information, they look at the track record of the vehicles, not of microfinance 
institutions and express a short track record as a major barrier. They see the financial and economic crisis 
as a crucial test. “Should this relatively young investment pass this test, then it will be viewed as a viable 
investment option for a much larger group of pension funds.” (World Microfinance Forum Geneva 2009, 
p.5). 
3.2  Returns of microfinance investments 
MIVs reach moderate returns  
Investors of the fastest growing MIVs (mutual funds and structured finance vehicles) seek a double-
bottom  line  (financial  and  social  return)  of  their  investment.  In  2004,  non-competitive  returns  of 
microfinance investments were still seen as a major 
obstacle for the entrance of commercial investors, 
as  pointed  out  by  a  SRI  director  of  an  investment 
services:  The  argument  that  “commercial  investors’ 
financial  returns  cannot  be  sacrificed  for  social 
returns” (Meehan 2004, p.17), heads the list of ten 
reasons why commercial investors hesitate to invest 
in  microfinance.  Yet,  in  2009,  the  second  largest 
microfinance asset manager Blue Orchards S.A. lists 
on  its  website  the  competitive  return  as  the  first 
important  component  of  its  profile:  “Microfinance 
debt  offers  a  better  return  than  monetary 
instruments (an estimated additional 150 to 200 basis 
points) with only a slightly higher level of risk: it is an 
excellent  alternative  to  fiduciary  deposits  or  certificates  of  deposits”  (Blue  Orchard  2009b).       12 
   
ResponsAbility, as the third largest microfinance asset manager, states that the ResponsAbility Global 
Microfinance Fund aims “for long term growth in value that is in excess of the fund currency money 
market value” (responsAbility 2009). Also Merrill Lynch promotes microfinance investments: Investors 
would not have to pay the “conscience penalty - lower returns for socially directed investments”(Merrill 
Lynch 2009). The pension fund ABP, that has invested USD 150 million in microfinance, also emphasizes 
that the fund is SRI committed, but “not at the cost of sacrificing investment returns” (Spijker 2008). As 
mutual funds and structured finance vehicles are fixed-income investments, they are often compared to 
money market returns.  
Aggregated data on MIV’s performance, available for 2006 to 2007, confirm that returns of registered 
mutual funds, accounting for a large part of overall MIV growth, have been improving and are close to 
money  market  returns.  The  Symbiotics  Microfinance  Index  (Symbiotics  2009)  which  reflects  the 
development five registered mutual funds since May 2004
11 , shows a positive trend.  
Total expense ratio improved slightly from 2,7% to 2,3% at the same time. The group of socially focused 
funds, exhibits the lowest average return of all MIV peer groups (1.5% in 2006, 3,4% in 2007, Euro terms), 
which is below money market returns. It also shows the highest total expense ratios (6,1% in 2006 and 
5,6% in 2007). Structured finance vehicles could offer competitive returns right from the start: For AA 
rated senior tranches CGAP identifies an average annual return of USD 5,3% (CGAP 2008b, p.6). The first 
structured finance vehicle, Blue Orchard Microfinance Securities I (BOMS I) offered in 2004 subordinated 
shares, divided into three risk levels (A lowest risk, C highest risk) with the following returns: 8% (C), 6% 
(B), 5% (A). Equity shares were sold at 12% (Blue Orchard 2009a). The structured finance vehicle “Blue 
Orchard  Loan  for  Development  2”  offered  in  2007  two  senior  tranches,  which  were  directed  at 
commercial investors. They were rated AA and BBB (Standard and Poor’s), and were offered at a premium 
of up to 40 basis points and 95 basis points above three months Euribor. Equity and Junior tranches were 
purchased by public investors and MIVs, offering an average yield of 8% in US Dollars (Reille and Forster 
2008, p.10). Compared to annual average Euribor and Libor rates for 2004 to 2007, all stated returns of 
mutual funds and structured finance vehicles are above or close to three months Euribor (or Libor rates 
respectively) (Bundesbank 2005, p.88; Bundesbank 2007, p. 112; Bundesbank 2009, p. 136). After the 
positive trend until 2007, the returns of MIVs have developed into a different direction since 2008. 
 
Total expense ratios decrease, but liquidity and hedging costs increase during crisis 
Determinants of MIV returns may indicate, if the level of today’s moderate, competitive returns can be 
maintained in the future. Returns of MIVs are influenced by several factors: Since there is no secondary 
market, the Net Asset Value (NAV) is not determined by the value of the principal (Pouliot 2006, p. 270). 
Hence, the change of the NAV) depends on the net interest cash flow. Furthermore, the NAV is influenced 
by total expense ratios.  
As indicated earlier, total expense ratios have decreased. This can be explained by the increasing number 
of MIVs reaching a critical size and realizing economies of scale. The average asset size increased from 
USD 20 million in 2004 to USD 80 million in 2007. Goodman finds that the minimum sustainable size of 
commercial investment funds is between USD 20 million and USD 30 million. An increasing number of 
MIVs reached this break-even point (Goodman 2006, p. 34). Higher deal sizes were realized because MFIs 
have increasingly been able to absorb long-term funding. Registered mutual funds’ average fixed income 
                                                           
11 According to Symbiotics Website each fund or sub-fund is equally weighted in the index and the index rate of return is 
calculated using the average monthly return of each fund or sub-fund share price. The index assumes full capitalization of 
earnings.       13 
   
Source: (responsAbility 2005-2010) 
investment sizes increased within one year from USD 0,9 million to USD 2 million in 2007. For all MIVs 
included in the CGAP surveys this deal size increased from USD 1,3 million to USD 2 million (CGAP 2008b, 
p. 3). If the market allows, deal sizes and the average MIV size may further increase, which would drive 
down the expense ratios.  
In 2008 / 2009, the international financial and economic crisis started to affect the microfinance sector. 
The impact on MIV returns are mixed: At a Virtual Conference organized by CGAP in November 2008, 
participants  concluded  that  refinancing  costs  for  MFIs  are  increasing,  but  availability  of  funding  is 
decreasing. Especially non-deposit taking MFIs refinanced by hard currency are affected. In general, credit 
risk of MFIs has increased (variations depend on the region) and hence, growth rates have slowed down 
considerably (CGAP 2009e, p. 10). Due to the increased risk and low growth, MIVs are lending less to MFIs 
and suffer from increased liquidity and increased loan loss provisions which impacts returns. The example 
of responsAbility Global MF Fund shows how liquidity increased since 2008. Along with increased hedging 
costs these development had negative impact on MIV returns.  
 
 
Another countervailing development is that the high concentration on the top tier 150 MFIs tends to drive 
costs of funding of MFIs down and shifts the bargaining power towards the MFI side that could now 
become more powerful in negotiations with lenders, as analyzed by Reille and Forster in February 2008. In 
well  developed  microfinance  markets  competition  among  MFIs  is  increasing  as  well.  Not  operating 
anymore in markets with little competition, MFIs need to offer lower interest rates to their clients (Reille 
and Forster 2008, p.11). However, this development is currently balanced out in most regions by the 
financial crisis with the increased costs of funding as described above. But when credit risk decreases 
again and the consequences of the crisis on costs of funding are weakened, it is likely that competition 
remains with decreasing interest rates impacting MIV returns.  
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Competitive returns are an important prerequisite for institutional investors, but social impact equally  
matters  
Our MIV survey reveals a mixed opinion on the influence of returns on investment volumes: 42% see this 
feature as a strong driver of private investments until today, but 21% state that returns have had little 
influence on private investments until now, 8% think that it has not had any influence at all. Regarding 
investors’ motivations, it sticks out that especially retail investors are not as interested in returns as the 
other  groups.  The  importance  is  measured  on  a  scale  of  five,  with  five  being  “very  important”. 
Respondents state that retail investors would on average classify risk-adjusted returns as “somewhat 
important” (level three) in their investment decision, but the social impact as “very important”. Whereas 
institutional investors and HNWI classify returns and social impact as equally “important” (level four). 
These findings indicate that the rise of registered mutual funds, which attract mainly retail investors, is to 
a high extend fuelled by the social interest of investors. In contrast the rise of structured finance vehicles, 
dominated by institutional investors, is a result of the double bottom line character of microfinance.  
However, according to the pension fund survey the most important reason for pension funds investing in 
microfinance is “social responsibility”. Risk-adjusted financial returns and diversification are still placed 
high, but do not rank first. Pension funds believe that financial returns are on an adequate level. Hence it 
can be concluded that, financial performance is a prerequisite for institutional investors entering the 
market, but that social performance remains of high importance (World Microfinance Forum Geneva 
2009, p.6).  
3.3  Financial risk of microfinance 
After having analized the return side of microfinance investments we now turn the risk profiles 
starting with a categorization of different risks linked to microfinance. 
Risk profile of microfinance – Looking at systematic and unsystematic risk of microfinance  
The attractiveness of microfinance as a future asset class lies in its risk profile compared to other asset 
classes.  Especially  the  low  correlation  of  microfinance  with  global  and  local  market  movements,  as 
identified  by  Swanson  (2007),  gains  attention  among  mainstream  investors.  Still,  discussions  among 
microfinance practitioners on microfinance risks tend to be little structured. However, in the last two 
years  –  accentuated  by  the  global  financial  and  economic  crises  –  risks  of  different  levels  became 
apparent. 
Modern  portfolio  theory  distinguishes  between  two  major  risk  categories:  1)  systematic  and  2) 
unsystematic, idiosyncratic or specific risks. Systematic risk refers to the risk that cannot be avoided 
through perfect diversification (Hockmann and Thießen 2007, p. 648). Systematic risks refer to overall 
market risks (e.g. recessions). Also part of systematic risk – is the systemic risk - though a clear definition 
is lacking. One possible, rather broad definition of systemic risk is offered by Kaufman and Scott and 
“refers  to  the  risk  or  probability  of  breakdowns  in  an  entire  system,  as  opposed  to  breakdowns  in 
individual parts or components, and is evidenced by co movements (correlation) among most or all the 
parts." (Kaufman and Scott 2003,p. 371) In contrast, specific risks are inherent in each investment one 
makes. Specific risk can be eradicated through appropriate diversification.       15 
   
The following table shall help to structure the following analysis of risk profiles in microfinance. In the 
category of specific risks, a further distinction has to be made between external factors and internal 
factors while the exposure of MFIs to systematic risks is given as external: 
Risk Category  Risks in Microfinance (Examples) 
Systematic  External (per se) 





Weak Management or mismanagement 
(Over-)expansion 
External 
MF Regulation and Legal Issues 
Competition among MFIs 
                   
 
Awareness for risks in microfinance increases. Specific risks are dominant 
Beginning with the specific risks inherent to microfinance, the industry had gained the reputation of being 
a low risk business as it stands out for good portfolio quality and microfinance clients for high repayment 
rates. Important microfinance institutions are characterized by low write-off ratios. In 2006, the largest 
340 MFIs had a write-off ratio of 1,2% on average. The standard indicator used to measure portfolio 
quality of MFIs, portfolio at risk over 30 days, is 2,6% on average for the same group of MFIs in 2006 (MIX 
2009).   
Hence, the loss given default (LGD) tends to be relatively low and present value of expected recoveries 
(ER) of microfinance investments relatively high. The U.S. asset managers Blue Orchard S.A. advertises 
microfinance for having default rates apparently lower than of many traditional commercial banks (Blue 
Orchard 2008a). As one possible explanation Blue Orchard S.A stresses the high diversification of MFI’s 
portfolios as MFIs are serving a large amount of customers with low average loan sizes. Another possible 
explanation generally brought up is linked to the methodology used by MFIs to deliver credits. One of the 
business principles in microfinance has traditionally been the exclusive relationship of an MFI with its 
clients  in  order  to  enforce  payments  based  on  “alternative”  collaterals  (collaterals  with  a  foremost 
“emotional” value to the client rather than a resale value for the MFI) or collateral substitutes (e.g. peer 
pressure  in  group  lending  mechanisms).  Furthermore,  the  exclusivity  of  MFI-client  relationships 
contributed to a strong repayment incentive for clients in order to get a new loan. The “closeness” of 
credit officers to their clients including a sound cash flow analysis and the assessment of repayment 
capacity and willingness plus the possibility to react at short notice once repayment problems occur 
mainly made the difference between a high risk “subprime loan” to a low risk microloan.  
However, the assumption that microfinance is a low risk business has been increasingly challenged in the 
last two years. This is partly due to an increasing exposure to systematic risks as MFIs become more 
integrated  into  the  international  and  local  commercial  financial  markets.  But  also  the  financial  crisis 
brought to light and speeded up specific risks dozing in many microfinance markets for a couple of years 
now. 
 
In 2008 the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI) launched its first “Microfinance Banana 
Skins” report (CSFI 2008). Through a survey of 305 microfinance stakeholders from 74 countries (analysts, 
observers, regulators, investors and practitioners) the authors identified 29 mayor risks microfinance 
Source: Own elaboration       16 
   
institutions face. The first ten risks mentioned were (following the order): management quality, corporate 
governance,  inappropriate  regulation,  cost  control,  staffing,  interest  rates,  competition,  managing 
technology,  political  interference  and  credit  risk.  All  of  these  risks  are  inherent  to  the  microfinance 
industry and some of them even linked to each other. For instance, the limited management quality 
(“MFIs tend to be dominated by visionaries who are strong on charisma but less so on management 
skills”
12) can lead to inefficiencies and high operational costs (“cost control”) while the risk of excessively 
high interest rates (“interest rates”) is attributed mainly to the effort of covering cost inefficiencies. At the 
same time, credit risk and competition are interrelated: increased competition induce MFIs to lower 
credit  standards  and  to  take  on  more  risk  when  lending  to  clients  This  can  cause  a  spread  of  over 
indebtedness and thus – besides painful experiences for their clients – a deterioration of loan portfolio. To 
avoid  increasing  credit  risk,  proper  managing  technology  are  necessary  and  then,  again,  appropriate 
staffing  and  strong  management  skills.  In  this  sense  the  risks  of  inadequate  cost  controls  and  non-
competitive interest rates and partly also the absence of adequate management technology as well as 
credit risk are rather outcomes of limited management quality than risks per se. At the same time, the 
governance  problems  many  microfinance  institutions  face  –  especially  those  based  on  courageous 
initiatives of individuals mostly in the NGO scene – are perceived as a high risk especially among investors 
and are majorly linked to problems of “low calibre personnel” (“management quality” and “staffing”) but 
also poor transparency. The risk of political interference as a specific risk in contrast to political instability 
in a broader sense is seen on the rise as microfinance gains more attention from politicians since its 
assertion as an important development tool. The danger of increasing political interference was named by 
one survey participant as “the dark side of Nobel prizes.” (CSFI 2008, p.20). 
In 2009, the second Banana Skins report was published and not surprisingly – due to the international 
financial crisis – external if not systematic risks increased in the opinion of then 430 participants (CSFI 
2009). These were majorly linked to aspects of funding (“Liquidity”, “Refinancing”, “Too little funding”) 
but also macroeconomic trends gained importance as MFIs experienced that portfolio deterioration was 
partly due to client’s affection of the real economic crisis following the financial crisis. The former hit also 
developing or emerging countries which did not suffer major distress within their banking system. Still, 
the main risks identified in the years before which are only partly related to the crisis remained under the 
first  ten,  namely  credit  risk  (nr.  1),  management  quality  (nr.  4),  corporate  governance  (nr.7)  and 
competition (nr.9). 
In February 2010 CSFI (2010) published an update on its second survey based on a series of meetings in 
which the results of the latter were discussed. It was further highlighted that in the first survey mainly 
“institutional” thus specific, internal challenges where perceived as major risks reflecting the belief that 
microfinance would be insulated from shocks at a global level. In the second survey only in Africa risks of 
this category continued to domain, while in other parts of the world risks systemic factors began to 
prevail. While the effects of the world economy totally defy MFI’s control the problem of funding had 
“sharpened the question of whether MFIs should go into deposit taking” (CSFI 2010, p.4). Still, special 
emphasis  was  put  on  the  increasing  competition  (external  specific  risk)  MFIs  had  to  face  and  will 
increasingly  have  to  face  in  the  future;  the  related  risk-taking  business  practices;  and  the  limited 
management capacities of many MFIs to deal with these risks. An “urgent need for a fundamentally more 
professional  approach”  (CSFI  2010,  p.5)  was  claimed  as  many  managements  a)  had  shown  to  be 
unprepared for shocks, b) had little understanding of “new” risks such as liquidity and c) knew little about 
risk management. Interestingly enough the management problems were one of the key issues already 
                                                           
12 See CSFI (2008). Microfinance Banana Skins 2008. Risk in a Booming Industry,  New York, CSFI.p.15.       17 
   
mentioned by Claus-Peter Zeitinger – the founder of IPC, later converting into the ProCredit Holding – in 
the mid nineties (Schmidt and Zeitinger 1996). 
Microfinance institutions face increasing competition, leading to multiple borrowing and client’s over 
indebtedness 
Even though the first delinquency crisis in microfinance took place as early as 1999 in Bolivia (Rhyne 2001) 
not before today the problem of multiple borrowing caused by fierce competition has become a major 
issue within the international discussion among microfinance stakeholders. Yet, multiple borrowing does 
not have to be a bad thing per se (especially from a client’s perspective) if the MFI knows about its clients’ 
relationships with its competitors and can thus properly incorporate this knowledge in the cash flow 
analysis  of  micro  entrepreneurs  and  their  families  to  adequately  assess  the  repayment  capacity.  In 
contrast, if MFIs due to increasing competition loosen their credit policies and explicitly start to target 
their competition’s clientele in concentrated geographic regions credit risk becomes a key issue. Apart 
from culpable negligence of credit officers and managers the organisational adaption of a rapid expansion 
(e.g. the introduction of adequate managing technology) as well as infrastructural features – especially 
the existence of credit bureaus providing timely information – strongly influence the capacity to assess 
and manage risks related to increasing competition. 
This has been shown not only by the above mentioned Banana Skins Reports but also by the recent 
experiences of repayment crises in four countries, namely Nicaragua, Morocco, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Pakistan (Chen, Rasmusen et al. 2010). In all four countries the portfolio at risk over 30 days rose 
sharply from 2008 onwards (Chen, Rasmusen et al. 2010, p.5) reaching as high levels as 13% in Pakistan.
13 
All four countries had at least two phenomena in common: a) a rapid growth in credit portfolio and b) 
that savings were neither a major service nor a large source of funds compared to the world’s average. 
Instead foreign debt capital as well as commercial borrowings from local markets was the major source of 
funding.  Furthermore,  in Nicaragua, Bosnia  and Herzegovina  as  well  as Morocco  all  large  MFIs were 
affected by increasing delinquency (with a portfolio at risk > 30 of 22%, 12% and 12% respectively). While 
in  Nicaragua  delinquency  was  further  pushed  by  political  support  of  the  “no  pago”  (no  payment) 
movement in the northern part of the country which, receiving political support, than spread over the 
country, in Morocco a contagion effect by the failure of a leading MFI – Zakoura with 20% of total assets – 
led to a sharpening of the repayment crisis. 
Microfinance  Institutions  not  complying  with  their  obligations  are  still  rare  but  have  serious 
consequences 
That  increasing  competition  and  thus  credit  risk  through  over  indebtedness  can  be  one  of  the  main 
courses of MFI defaults in the future was also highlighted by an investor’s survey realized by International 
Association of Microfinance Investors. Between 1994 and 2008 the author of the study identified at least 
60 payment defaults to MIVs totalling nearly USD 8.1 million (Abrams 2009, p.3). Reasons mentioned for 
MFI defaults were in line with the risks identified in the Banana Skins report. Even though illiquidity was 
mentioned as the number one cause (risk) of MFI defaults it was often an outcome of an inherent, specific 
risk rather than a risk in itself (“There were numerous underlying causes of illiquidity, such as fraud, 
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mismanagement, and poor portfolio quality” 
14). Only one systematic risk – exchange rate fluctuations 
creating liquidity shortfalls – was mentioned as a reason for illiquidity. 
The very low level of debt default rate of (~2%) was attributed to the specific relationship between MFIs 
and investors (such as restructuring of loans and repayment accelerations). An interesting, external factor 
is the importance of “institutional support or rescue of promising MFIs” (Abrams 2009, p.10). Especially 
MFI Networks do not want MFIs to fail and intervened with fresh capital in times MFI went through times 
of distress. This is also pointing to the increasing need of equity rather than debt financing. However, the 
author states that the microfinance investment industry has a rather short track record and that further 
research should include studies on MFI failures prior to the recent investment activities. 
In  cases  when  financial  distress  actually  leads  to  the  liquidation  of  an  MFI,  also  the  percentage  of 
investments  affected  by  the  default  has  to  be  considered  evaluating  the  riskiness  of  microfinance 
investments. Rozas (2009) studied 5 individual cases of MFI failures
15 pointing out that in two cases 
investors  walked  away  empty  handed  while  in  other  cases  a  recovery  rate  of  20%-40%  had  to  be 
considered as good. Comparing these figures with the 4% unsecured creditor losses during the liquidation 
of Washington Mutual in September 2008 – one of the largest banks in the USA – Rozas highlights the 
difficulties  particular  to  the  microfinance  industry  of  transferring  assets  (here  the  MFI’s  portfolio)  to 
another institution for recovery. He argues that – besides the restrictions in the legal environment which 
allows to enforce property rights properly – the lending methodology of MFIs, especially the “closeness” 
of credit officers to its clients as well as the incentive for clients to repay a loan in order to get a new one, 
links the portfolio of an MFI to the individual organisation in a manner that “requires evaluating the 
portfolio not for performance, but for collectability” (Rozas 2009, p.8). Furthermore, he stresses that 
microloans had the propensity to default en masse. The latter was also true for the above mentioned 
delinquency crises. Rozas points out, that this might also be of importance regarding the creation of new 
investment products such as collateralized debt obligation at MFI level, as the portfolio of an MFIs is just 
worth  as  much  as  the  MFI  as  an  organisation  itself  (with  its  given  governance  structures  and 
management). 
Even though resulting out of specific risks in microfinance, the complex of problems related to mass 
defaults  due  to  the  effects  of  over-indebtedness  and  multiple  borrowing  can  also  be  seen  as  a 
(microfinance) systemic risk at local or even national level according to Kaufman’s second definition: 
“systemic risk is the probability that cumulative losses will accrue from an event that sets in motion a 
series of successive losses along a chain of institutions of markets comprising a system ... That is, systemic 
risk is the risk of a chain reaction of falling interconnected dominos” (Kaufman 1995, p. 47). 
Nevertheless, the low systematic risk of microfinance in general and the potential weak correlation of 
microfinance investments with global and local market movements recently attracted much attention. 
Public attention is high, but few studies try to prove low systematic risk  
Dieckmann  (2007)  underlines  that  MFIs  follow  a  substantially  “different  business  model”  than 
conventional banks, characterized by a smaller integration of their clients into the formal economy and 
the focus on domestic products and services which are less affected by currency fluctuations (Dieckmann 
2008, p.3). CGAP argues that it is “conventional wisdom” that microfinance is countercyclical and less 
                                                           
14 See Abrams, J. (2009). Zero is Not the Number: The Microfinance Debt Default Rate. A Baseline Analysis,  New York, IAMFI., 
p. 9. 
15 SOMED in Uganda, WEEC in Kenya, Bank Dagang Bali in Indonesia, FOCCAS in Uganda and ICICI Bank in India       19 
   
vulnerable to economic downturns (CGAP 2009c). Since 2007 articles in business newspapers and the 
general press have been increasingly reporting on this topic. The Financial Times reports on the low 
correlation of microfinance with world economic movements in May 2007 (Tully 2007). Financial Times 
Deutschland followed with several articles, among them one about microfinance funds’ performance in 
times of crisis in 2008 (Diekmann 2008). The articles, with headlines as “Microfinance Funds – Returns 
with  a  good  conscience”  („Mikrofinanz-Fonds  -  Gewinne  mit  gutem  Gewissen“)  (Euler  2008)  stress, 
besides the improving returns, the good performance and constant portfolio growth of microfinance 
mutual funds during crisis. ResponsAbility claims that microfinance institutions even tend to increase their 
client base during crises (Blue Orchard 2008a). Blue Orchard S.A. finds that the value of microfinance 
investments  is  not  influenced  by  hard  to  predict  interest  rates  and  credit  spread  movements  and 
therefore shows a lower volatility than other emerging market securities. In addition, the investment 
research firm Morningstar recommends that microfinance funds can be suitable for the integration in a 
portfolio because of the low correlation with other asset classes contributing to portfolio diversification 
(Morningstar 2007). 
Despite  the  considerable  public  attention  on  that  topic,  few  academic  studies  have  been  published, 
proving these statements. First exemplary evidence regarding the resilience of microfinance during crises 
was presented regarding the 1997- 1998 financial crisis in Asia. McGuire and Conroy (2009) examined 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Asia finding that MFIs focusing primarily on the poor appear 
to  have  been  more  resistant  to  the  crisis  than  institutions  focusing  on  higher  income  target  groups 
(McGuire 2009, p.18). Benoit Calderón (2006, p. 65) presented in 2006 data on the development of 
portfolio growth and portfolio quality of MFIs in three Latin American countries during economic and 
political crises. He found for the case of Bolivia that in the period from 1995 to 2003 MFIs’ portfolio grew 
steadily whereas aggregate portfolio of commercial banks declined. The portfolio quality (PAR > 30 days) 
of commercial banks has deteriorated since 1998, at the same time the portfolio quality of MFIs improved 
(Calderón 2006, p. 67). For Peru and the Dominican Republic similar anecdotal evidence is presented. 
Gonzales, a researcher affiliated to The MIX, conducted the first econometric study in this field and 
examined the correlation of MFIs’ portfolio quality, measured in Portfolio at Risk > 30 days, with local 
macroeconomic movements, measured in GNI per capita (Gonzalez 2007, p.7). The dataset comprised 639 
MFIs in 88 countries, in the period from 1999 to 2005. He did not find a statistically significant positive 
relationship between these variables and concluded that MFIs are immune to local economic shocks, 
controlling for MFI and country characteristics. The most elaborated study was conducted by Krauss and 
Walter (2008). The last version of their empirical analysis, examining the systemic risk of microfinance, 
was published in 2008 and indicated that there is no exposure of MFIs to global capital markets, but 
significant exposure to domestic market movements (Krauss and Walter 2008, p. 2). These results imply a 
positive portfolio diversification effect for international investors, but not for local investors. Walter and 
Krauss regressed six indicators of MFIs’ performance (Net operating income, ROE, portfolio growth, total 
asset growth, PAR >30 days and profit margin) against proxies for global market risk (S&P 500, Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World and MSCI Emerging Markets) and against domestic GDP, as a 
proxy for domestic market risk (Krauss and Walter 2008, p. 8). The dataset included 325 MFIs in 66 
emerging  countries.  The  same  regressions  were  conducted  for  commercial  banks  of  the  respective 
countries and resulted in the second outcome of the study: MFIs are less exposed to systematic risk than 
commercial  banks  because  one  or  more  performance  indicators  of  MFIs  were  less  correlated  to  the 
market  indices  than  the  indicators  of  commercial  banks.  The  authors  stress  that  these  are  tentative 
results because the data quality regarding the MFI side was low and reporting standards are still not 
applied on a broad basis.        20 
   
Financial and economic crisis as a test  
The studies cited above did not include the period of the recent crisis. As stated in part 3.1 pension funds 
see this crisis as a major test for the systematic risk of microfinance. The drop of returns may indicate that 
microfinance, being more integrated into international capital markets today than in the periods of the 
cited studies, are not completely resilient to local and global market movements.  
Recent  news  of  a  microfinance  asset  managers  strengthens  this  assumption:  RresponsAbility  Global 
Microfinance Fund temporarily suspended the issuance of fund shares in May 2010 and justifies this with 
a decreased demand for credit due to the impact of the crisis (responsAbility 2010a).  
A  CGAP  survey  further  analyzes  how  microfinance  clients  and  MFIs  are  impacted:  The  economic 
contraction, massive job losses, and a drop of remittances is hitting microfinance clients and MFIs are 
suffering  from  a  dramatic  slowdown  of  portfolio  growth,  a  decrease  of  portfolio  quality,  liquidity 
constraints and higher costs of funding (Reille, Kneiding et al. 2009).  
The fact that the portfolios of MIVs are highly concentrated on few countries increases the relevance of 
systematic risk for MIV returns. Countries such as Bosnia and Nicaragua, affected by the global crisis and 
hence by over indebtedness are among the top ten countries of six large MIVs (Blue Orchard 2010a; 
Credit Suisse 2010; EFSE 2009; Oikocredit 2010).The example of the Dexia Microcredit Fund shows that if 
one country is negatively affected there is an immediate impact on MIV returns: The asset manager 
attributes a negative return in September 2009 to the impact of the crisis on Nicaragua (Fuchs 2010).  
MIVs assume a high portfolio diversification effect – Pension funds require longer track record 
59% of the participants of our MIV survey think that the risk profile will be a strong driver for microfinance 
investments in the future. 38% of the survey participants believe that there is a weak correlation of 
microfinance with global market movements. Another 38% state that they identify weak correlation with 
global and local market movements at the same time. On this topic several additional comments were 
made indicating a high interest of MIVs. Two participants point out that this low correlation will decrease 
as MFIs rely increasingly on commercial funding, with “mainstream finance moving into the markets”. 
Although MIV respondents assume a potential portfolio diversification effect, 59% agree or tend to agree 
that  there  is  a  demand  among  their  investors  for  an  intensified  research  on  the  correlation  of 
microfinance with global or local market movements. The survey results further suggest that the topic of 
portfolio diversification is especially relevant to institutional investors (“important” for institutional and 
HNWI and “somewhat important” for retail investors).  
Pension funds most frequently mention “uncertainty about longer-term development of risk levels” as a 
barrier for microfinance investments. For them, the short track record does not allow to adequately 
assess  the  risk  level  (World  Microfinance  Forum  Geneva  2009).  In  contrast,  the  track  record  of 
microfinance does not seem to be an issue for many MIVs anymore (as stated by 46% of the participants).  
3.4  Microfinance and Social Investment - Reputational Risk 
A major difference of microfinance compared to other (future) asset classes is also its roots in social 
and development policies. Investors seek a social return of their investment which is not considered 
in modern portfolio theory as a factor which influences investors’ decision making.        21 
   
According to our MIV survey, the rise of Social Responsible Investments (SRI) is seen by a majority as a 
major driver of investments in microfinance. 21% constitute a strong influence until today, and 38% 
believe that SRI will also in the future be a strong driver. In addition, the publicity for microfinance 
through the Nobel Peace Prize to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank has supported investment 
growth considerably, as stated by 58%.  
Thus, it can be assumed that reputation – here for the social/ethical/environmental performance – as an 
intangible asset has a big potential for value creation as suggested by Roberts and Dowling (2002). Still, 
“reputation is constructed in the mind of others and as such inherently a subjective construct” and as it is 
also “a composite measure: in terms of gathering together perceptions from various stakeholders whose 
perceptions are, in turn, formed from multiple data sources and from their own previous knowledge of 
the  entity  in  question”  (Bebbington,  Larrinaga  et  al.  2004,  p.8).  Therefore  reputation  is  hard  to 
conceptualize.  
A survey of 269 senior executives responsible for managing risks conducted by EIU in 2005 furthermore 
identified reputation as “the risk of risks” (EIU 2005). Among the major findings were: a) reputation is a 
prized,  highly  valuable,  corporate  asset  b)  companies  struggle  to  categorize  –  let  alone  quantify  – 
reputational risk c) compliance failures are the biggest source of reputational risk d) good communication 
is vital to protect against reputational damage. 
In microfinance different levels of reputational risks have to be distinguished. Beyond the reputation of a 
single MFI, the industry as such has a reputation. Reputation damages of single MFIs can affect the 
reputation of other MFIs. Furthermore microfinance overall has a certain reputation regarding its way of 
doing business (such as acting socially responsible) as well as its social impact (poverty alleviation, women 
empowerment etc.). Consequently, several reputational risks can be identified. 
Irresponsible  Business  practices  and  ongoing  discussions  about  mission  drift  might  jeopardize 
microfinance reputation as social investment 
 
At  the  latest  since  Robinson  (2001)  called  out  “The  Microfinance  Revolution”  enthusiasm  among 
microfinance practitioners and academics grew believing that microfinance services could be offered both 
in a social, thus poverty alleviating, and financially sustainable or even profitable way. The euphoria of 
having found the ultimate weapon against poverty was considerably disturbed by the “Compartamos 
debate”. For the time being, the criticism about high interest rates in microfinance and little transparency 
towards its clients peaked in the often cited (and long expected?) phrase of Muhammad Yunus: "We 
created microcredit to fight the loan sharks; we didn't create microcredit to encourage new loan sharks.”, 
which was published in April 2010 in the New York Times (MacFarquhar 2010).  
Furthermore, there is an ongoing discussion about the “mission drift” of MFIs, thus, the tendency to 
extend larger average loan sizes (and/or disregard other social goals) leaving behind the “poorest of the 
poor” as scaling-up. Or, more general, we can find the discussion on microfinance tradeoffs, the tension 
between meeting social goals and maximizing financial performance. Both are accompanied by the work 
of academics leading to mixed results. While scholars tend to negate the hypothesis of an existing mission 
drift among MFIs (Copestake 2007; Mersland and Strøm 2010) they do indeed find a trade-off between 
financial and social returns (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2009). This debate will probably continue to be 
fierce, especially as consent on how to adequately measure social performance has still to be found. Still, 
there  are  various  social  performance  initiatives  bringing  together  practitioners,  donors,  investors 
(multilateral, bilateral, and private), national and regional networks, technical assistance providers, rating       22 
   
agencies, academics and researchers; such as the Social Performance Task Force an open network with 
more than 350 members, with the objective to enhance knowledge exchange and to create a common 
social performance framework (Social Perfomane Task Force 2010). To respond to the demands of socially 
motivated investors and to the increasing criticism on high interest rates, little transparency as well as 
client’s (over)indebtedness it might be crucial in the future to find common social standards and clearly 
communicate what is meant by social performance measurement and management, Accordingly, the 
participants of our MIV survey state that the lack of social impact measurement has not been overcome 
and is still seen as a minor (38%) or major barrier (29%). This lack of measurement coincides with an 
increasing  demand:  87%  indicate  that  they  have  identified  an  increasing  interest  in  social  impact 
measurement by their investors within the last four years. The majority (50%) says that social ratings will 
have high importance in the future. This finding may be connected to the participants’ statements about 
increasing critique towards microfinance: 63% agree or tend to agree that current public critique on 
microfinance is a considerable threat for the image of microfinance as a SRI.  
At the same time, pension funds see “reputational risks associated with microfinance being accused of 
unethical practices in the media” as a major barrier for further investments. Another indicator, that the 
documentation of positive social returns towards investors is becoming more and more important could 
also  be  the  first  social  performance  reports  issued  by  major  MIVs.  For  instance,  Incofin  (a  Belgian 
microfinance investment manager) launched its first social performance report in 2009. responsAbility 
Social  Investments  AG  (one  of  the  biggest  MIVs  based  in  Switzerland)  already  publishes  social 
performance reports since 2005. Still, a comprehensive analytical instrument (rADER – responsAbility 
Development Effectiveness Rating) is still in development (Dewez and Neisa 2009; responsAbility 2010b). 
 
The impact of microfinance on poverty reduction and other social goals is questioned 
 
Finally, with more sound methodologies (such as randomized control trials) and an increasing interest of 
leading  researchers  in  the subject  (e.g.  the  Financial Access  Initiative  of NYU,  Harvard  and Yale)  the 
assessment of the impact of microfinance and its heterogeneous results increasingly catches the attention 
of the media and socially motivated investors. Recent studies question specific assumptions of causal 
impact  chains  such  as  the  increase  in  income  for  female  microfinance  clients  and  their  progress  in 
decision making as a precondition for their economic, social and political empowerment (Banarjee, Duflo 
et al. 2009; Karlan and Zinman 2009). The media attention on this topic has even motivated some of the 
most  important  networks  for  microfinance  (Acción,  FINCA,  Grameen  Foundation,  Opportunity 
International, Unitus and Womens’ World Banking) to heavily demonstrate against these studies: “As 
microfinance  practitioners,  we  have  witnessed  the  positive  impact  of  microfinance  first-hand...  The 
media’s  interpretations  of  several  recent  studies  on  the  impact  of  microfinance,  however,  have 
questioned whether microfinance has made a quantitative improvement in the lives of the borrowers, or 
has  had  any  effect  on  poverty  alleviation  on  a  systemic  basis...Such  studies  face  two  fundamental 
challenges: their ability to capture and analyze all the benefits of microfinance, and the duration of the 
study itself” (Accion et al. 2010). Also in this area, it is clear that the last word has not been spoken yet. 
3.5  Ability of Vehicles to Attract Mainstream Investment 
Before  we  turn  in  the  next  section  to  the  investees  and  thus  the  market  size  and  investment 
opportunities,  we  now  assess  the  stage  of  development  of  MIVs  and  its  capacity  to  channel 
mainstream investments.       23 
   
High number of vehicles – but few main players  
In 2003, a publication on private microfinance investments found that “there is not a single retail social 
investment fund with significant investment in microfinance in emerging markets” (Jansson 2003, p. 16). 
This situation has changed significantly as shown in part 3.1. Goodman (2006) underlines the essential 
role  of  appropriate  vehicles:  “The  latest  developments  demonstrate  that  whenever  a  microfinance 
investment  fund  is  structured  appropriately  for  its  targeted  investors,  there  is  no  lack  of  financial 
resources ”(Goodman 2006, p.11). Hence, a precondition for mainstream investors entering the market 
on a larger scale, besides an attractive risk-return profile and a proven social impact, are appropriate 
vehicles channelling the investments.  
Without a doubt there are today professionally managed vehicles available which have built reputation 
over several years. The establishment of mutual funds and structured finance vehicles have significantly 
contributed  to  investment  growth  as  shown  before.  While  the  introduction  of  investment  banking 
techniques,  through  structured  finance  vehicles,  made  large  investments  by  institutional  investors 
possible, the development and professionalization of mutual funds attracted retail investors. They can 
invest small investment sizes, as vehicles offer shares of USD 1.000 (ResponsAbility Global Microfinance 
Fund). However, mutual funds still face considerable challenges from regulation. Non-listed and non-rated 
securities (such as microfinance investments) can only in some countries be included in the portfolio of 
registered mutual funds. The optimistic growth projections of DB Research are based on the assumption 
that regulatory barriers for microfinance mutual funds will be overcome (Dieckmann 2008, p. 11). 
Swanson (2007) argues that the most fundamental change for MFIs’ funding occurred in 2004, when the 
first Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) was introduced to the market and attracted for the first time 
high investment volumes by institutional investors (Swanson 2007). One major concern of institutional 
investors, the small deal size (Meehan 2004, p.24), could be overcome by the characteristics of a CDO. 
Generally,  MFIs  have  small  balance  sheets  in  comparison  to  commercial  banks.  CDOs  pool  together 
portfolios of several MFIs: Through global securitization, which means the securitization and pooling of 
portfolios of several MFIs, a size necessary to be cost-effective can be reached (Jansson 2003, p. 12). 
Secondly, transformation of risk is an essential part of the characteristics of this vehicle. Part of a CDO is 
the tranching of the issued asset backed securities, which is done by the SPV (Byström 2008)- In this way 
different  risk-return  profiles  can  be  offered  to  investors.  This  is  especially  relevant  for  mainstream 
investors, because they can choose a less risky asset, when accepting a moderate return (Meehan 2004, 
p.12). Moreover, the involvement of public investors and foundations as guarantors or purchasers of 
equity tranches increases the reputation of the vehicle and reduces risk. For example, in the case of BOLD 
1, the Dutch development bank FMO underwrote the entire subordinated note class and the Grameen 
Foundation  and  Skoll  foundation  purchased  equity  tranches.  Hence  a  wide  range  of  investors  was 
attracted, including foundations, SRI Managers, SRI Funds, private and institutional investors (including 
large European commercial banks and a U.S. pension fund) (Blue Orchard 2008b). 
But although there are more than 100 vehicles in the market today, the most investment is attracted by 
not more than 5 MIVs. As shown in part 3.1 over half of microfinance investments is managed by five 
asset  managers.  Blue  Orchard  S.A.  now  manages  six  vehicles  (Dexia  Microcredit  Fund,  St.  Honoré 
Microfinance Fund, Dual Return Fund SICAV and three structured finance vehicles) (Blue Orchard 2008b). 
Credit Suisse Microfinance Fund Management Company manages the four microfinance funds advised by 
ResponsAbility  Social  Investment  AG  (ResponsAbility  Global  Microfinance  Fund,  ResponsAbility  SICAV 
Microfinance Leaders Fund and responsibility Mikrofinanz-Fonds). A rating of these vehicles does not       24 
   
exist, and a labelling of microfinance mutual funds was only introduced recently. So far seven mutual 
funds qualified for the label “LuxFLAG” (Luxflag 2008)
16. 
The largest MIVs are today highly renowned – but their number is limited and hedging remains the 
major constraint 
 
The professional management of microfinance investment products is evaluated by 33% of participating 
MIVs as a strong driver until today; additionally 21% believe that it remains a strong driver in the future. 
According to a majority of participants, the establishment of appropriate investment vehicles was an 
important  driver  of  the  boom:  46%  of  the  participants  find  that  the  lack  of  appropriate  investment 
vehicles has been overcome. 17% still see it as a minor obstacle today. No respondent evaluates it as an 
important  barrier  in  the  future.  Nevertheless,  it  may  be  obvious  that  MIVs  themselves  see  their 
professional management as an important factor for the sector. 
Participants  of  our  MIV  survey  state  that  a  lack  of  knowledge  about  the  specific  risks  related  to 
microfinance  investments  and  a  lack  of  experience  in  emerging  markets  investments  are  no  longer 
important barriers for private investments (67% and 84%). Learning curve effects have been realized. This 
is underlined by the fact that pension funds have not researched the market in depth but rely on MIVs as 
their  main  source  of  information  (World  Microfinance  Forum  Geneva  2009,  p.8).  But  pension  funds 
identify a lack of professional management and suitable products as constraints: The “availability of a 
larger  choice  of  microfinance  fund  managers  and  products”,  “better  and  more  professional  risk 
management” would very much increase future investment (World Microfinance Forum Geneva 2009, 
p.7). 
The establishment of professionally managed vehicles also depends on the regulation of MIVs in their 
countries of origin. Opinions are mixed: 50% evaluate it as a minor or important obstacle, whereas 25% 
say this barrier has been overcome. The most relevant barrier from the perspective of MIVs is local 
currency hedging. This notion is reflected in the opinion of participants stating that the development of 
hedging tools has had little influence until today on investment growth (4%) but will be a strong driver in 
the future (46%). Despite these barriers, MIV respondents feel that the competition among MIVs will 
increase:  21%  believe  this  will  be  a  major  issue  for  MIVs,  though  33%  of  respondents  categorize 
competition as a minor obstacle today and only 8% as a current major issue.  
3.6  Market Size and Investment Opportunities 
Despite the opportunities offered through improved risk adjusted returns, first indications for a positive 
contribution to portfolio diversification and the fast development of professionally managed vehicles, the 
growth potential of the market depends on the investees. According to Swanson the top tier MFIs are 
overbanked. E.g. only about 100 MFIs worldwide are eligible for financing their portfolio by participating 
in a CDO (Swanson 2007, p.14, 22). 
The  number  of  MIVs  grew  from  38  in 2004  to  103  in  2008.  Average  MIV  asset  sizes  also  increased 
significantly from USD 20 million in 2004 to USD 161,2 million in 2008.
17 However, in 2008 the growth 
slowed down: While assets under management increased MIVs grew only by 31% in 2008. 
                                                           
16 The Luxembourg Fund Labelling Agency (LuxFLAG) is an independent, non profit making, association created in 
Luxembourg in July 2006. The primary objective of the LuxFLAG Microfinance Label is to reassure investors that the MIV 
actually invests, directly or indirectly, in the Microfinance sector. 
17 Average MIV size refers to the participants of the CGAP survey (54 participants).        25 
   
Source Data: The MIX 
On the one hand, as shown in part 2, the MIV portfolio grew on average by 71% from 2005 to 2007 (CGAP 
2009a). On the other hand, MFIs gross loan portfolio grew by a compound annual growth rate of only 
38.6% and the number of borrowers by 23.5% (Gonzalez 2009)
18. In 2008 the MIVs still grew by 31% 
(CGAP 2009d) while MFIs gross loan portfolio grew by 20.1%. Foreign investors are clearly not the only 
funding  source  for  MFIs  (even 
though  an  important  one  for 
some  of  them).  In  2008  foreign 
capital  investments  in 
microfinance exceeded 10 billion 
USD
19  while  the  gross  loan 
portfolio  of  MFIs  was  over  44 
billion USD. It is still noteworthy 
that the growth rates of foreign 
capital  flowing  into  the 
microfinance  sector  exceeded 
the  growth  of  MFIs  lending 
activities  in  all  years  since 
2004.  In  practitioners’  discussions  it  is  often  mentioned,  that  MFIs  growth  was  pushed  by  capital 
injections.  Even  though  further  econometric  research  is  necessary  to  find  out  more  about  assumed 
causalities, the graph above, which displays the asset development of some of the world’s leading MFIs, 
shall exemplify the argument
20. 
The  development  of  the  market  size  and  the  transparency  of  the  market  are  in  general  crucial  for 
mainstream investors assessing the future development of the asset. But will the microfinance industry be 
able to keep pace with the increasing capital injections? To answer this crucial question at least two 
additional issues need to be analyzed: First, if the number of MFIs ready to receive investments actually 
has increased considerably in the past and is likely to continue to increase in the future. And then, if yes, 
how capable is a single MFI and microfinance markets in general of absorbing the increasing capital flows. 
 
There are an increasing number of sustainable MFIs. Still, concentration of assets in single MFIs or 
markets is pronounced 
In  2007,  3.316  microfinance
21  institutions  were  reported  worldwide  (Daley-Harris  2007).  Three  years 
before Meehan (2004, p.7) distinguishes between four different tiers of MFIs. Only 2% - at most – could 
                                                           
18 These numbers are based on the analysis of 1,395 MFIs reporting to the MIX. In the following, for aggregated for 2008 
please refer to the same source. 
19 Equity and debt capital from DFIs and private investors. See CGAP (2009d). MIV Performance and Prospects: Highlights 
from the CGAP 2009 MIV Benchmark Survey, Brief,  Washington D.C., CGAP. 
20 The MFIs within this graph have been chosen because: a) BancoSol is the first MFIs which ever transformed into a 
microfinance bank and is known for its promising development. Bolivia where BancoSol is located is one of the countries 
with the best micrfofinance regualtion and investment climate. b) SKS is the biggest MFI in India and latetly called attention 
because of its planned international IPO. c) Compartamos already launched the first international IPO in 2007 and attracted 
a lot of international as well as national investments. d) BRAC in Bangladesh is known for the first securization in 
Microfinance and d) MiBanco is the biggest MFI in Peru which lately has been named as the most favourable country for the 
development of microfinance. 
21 This number gathered during the Microcredit Summit Campaign does not reflect the total number of worldwide existing 
MFIs but might be representative for the MFIs with international visibility and connectivity.       26 
   
be  considered  1
st  tier  MFIs  with  strong  financial  and  operational  track  records  (“Top  50  or  100”
22; 
regarding portfolio size and profitability). 8% of all MFIs were in the 2
nd tier compounded mostly by 
successful NGOs (nearly) reaching profitability. Meehan attests the majority of these MFIs good chances 
to rise. 20% of MFIs, the 3
rd tier, were approaching profitability while 70% of all MFIs were unprofitable 
with only some of them having a chance to rise. Dieckman (2008, p.7-8) adds, that 10% of the MFIs (1
st 
and 2
nd tier MFIs) held the bulk of microfinance clients and loan portfolio. He counts 150 MFIs in this 
category which are mostly regulated MFIs and the most attractive for institutional and private investors. 
As further certification mark for interested investors Dieckman mentions a loan gross portfolio over 100 
Mio.USD which by then was reached by 30 MFIs.  
According  to  the  MIX  “Microbanking  Bulletin:  2008  Benchmark”  database  accounting  for  1.087  MFIs 
worldwide, 62% of all MFIs declared to have a non-for-profit status while 38% had a for-profit status. At 
the same time 51% of all MFIs reached financial sustainability (MIX 2009). Still, financial sustainability 
does  not  automatically  indicate  that  the  MFI  has  reached  a  degree  of  profitability  interesting  for 
(commercial) investors. Considering the data from 1.163 MFIs directly reported to The MIX in 2008
23, 280 
MFIs  (24.12%) reached  negative  returns  on  assets  (ROA<0%),  365  MFIs  (31.3%)  reached  low  returns 
(ROA≥0%<3%), 172 MFIs (14.8%) reached moderate returns (ROA≥3%<5%) and 277 MFIs (23.8%) reached 
high returns (ROA≥5%) while for 69 MFIs the data provided to calculate the ROA was not sufficient. Only 
5.7% of MFIs reached a very high return on assets between 10% and 20% and as little as 1.5% reached a 
return on assets like the “all-time profit champion” Banco Compartamos (ROA>20%). Thus, the portion of 
sustainable or even profitable MFIs (with publicly available information) has increased considerably since 
2004 and by 2008 already 80 MFIs had a gross loan portfolio of USD 100 million. Anyway, there is a strong 
regional concentration of highly profitable MFIs. Nearly 70% of MFIs reaching return on assets over 10% 
are located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as well as Latin America. Furthermore, the concentration 
of number of clients in MFIs remains pronounced. In 2008 less than 2% of MFIs reached more than 
500.000 active borrowers – a number which Compartamos reached between 2005 and 2006. 8.6% of MFIs 
concentrated 78,6% of all active borrowers. The concentration of clients within a few MFIs cannot only be 
observed on a worldwide scale but also within single countries. In India 10% of all MFIs hold 76% of all 
MFI clients (excluding Self Help Groups), a picture extremely similar to the world’s average (Srinivasan 
2009, p.47). In Morocco by end 2008 the three biggest MFIs (Al Amana, FBPMC, Zakoura) concentrated 
84% of total assets (based on 10 MFIs which reported to The Mix) while the single biggest MFI alone (Al 
Amana) already concentrated 45%. The finding that the number of highly profitable MFIs is still limited is 
underlined by the fact that there are only few examples of Initial Public Offerings (IPOS) so far. Bank 
Rakyat, BRAC, Equity  Bank  and  Compartamos  are  high-performing  institutions  showing  a  very  strong 
growth. They successfully started refinancing their institutions through the issuance of shares at local 
stock  markets.  Although  it  means  a  breakthrough  in  the  history  of  microfinance  investments,  the 
requirements for MFIs to go this step are very high and hence prospects for an increasing number of IPOs 
rather pessimistic at this stage (Lieberman, Anderson et al. 2007). 
Another way to assess the numbers of MFIs ready to attract funding of investors interested in financial 
returns is the use of ratings provided by specialized and mainstream rating agencies. The statistics of the 
                                                           
22 Please note that, unless Meehan does not clearly disclose her data sources she refers to 100 MFIs max. as 2%, thus 
counting a total of 2,000 existing MFIs. 
23 Considering the MFIs reporting to the MIX seems reasonable for the following argument as MFIs reporting voluntarily to 
this information exchange platform are probably those seeking international funding, and thus attach importance to 
international visibility, which nowadays only The MIX provides.        27 
   
Data source: Rating Fund I 
Rating Fund 1 encompass 526 rating reports of 388 MFIs worldwide
24. The rating grades of different rating 
agencies cannot be compared easily. One reason is the diverse symbologies. For example MicroRate uses 
Greek letters while Planet Rating uses Latin letters. Some older rating reports even show no letter grades 
at all. But even if you want to compare ratings of different rating agencies applying letter grades, the 
comparison might be misleading due to the difference in their rating methodologies. Still, one can identify 
major rating categories. Focusing on 404 ratings where letter grades have been assigned to the major 
categories – letters lifted or lowered by another letter or +/- – will be attached to a number from 1 to 4 
with  1  being  the  highest  and  4  the  lowest  category.
25  To  assess  the  number  of  MFIs  “ready”  for 
investments multiple ratings of one and the same MFI will be excluded. In case various rating issues exist 
only the last rating will be taken into account. Thus, the following analysis only assess the percentages of 
MFIs which in any moment between 2001 and 2008 reached a certain rating category and leaves aside 
any rating movements which might have 
occurred. Doing so, the number of MFIs 
with a letter grade rating is reduced to 
317. Of these MFIs rated between 2001 
and  2008  17.4%  were  in  the  first 
category, 52.3% in the second category, 
19.7% in the third and 10.7% in the forth 
category. Thus, in over half of the ratings 
MFIs were considered to have a low or 
moderate  risk  exposure  and/or  a  good 
institutional  performance 
(approximately reaching A and B letter grades). 
 
Looking at the different rating grades assigned in different years the distribution of rating grades does not 
differ too much between 2003 and 2007. Before 2003 the percentage of category 1 ratings appears so 
high mainly because only a limited numbers of ratings were realized with subsidies from the Rating Fund I 
(4 ratings in 2001 and 10 ratings in 2002). Also the number of ratings in 2008 – the last year of funding 
through this mechanism – is much lower than in previous years (27 in 2008 versus 95 in 2007). Thus, the 
decrease of good performing MFIs does not necessarily reflect the influence of the beginning financial 
crisis on MFIs but rather the limited data availability. Considering the 22 ratings funded by the Rating 
Fund II (20 in 2009 and 2 in 2010) which covers only the Latin American region 73% of all rating grades 
assigned were within the second category while 27% were in the third category. 
The statistics from the Rating Fund I and II are not representative in so far as a) they encompass only a 
limited number of MFIs which furthermore are more likely to be good performing MFIs compared to non-
rated MFIs and b) there is much larger number of non co-funded ratings and the proportion of co-funded 
                                                           
24 In May 2001, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) 
launched a joint initiative called the Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund. The European Union subsequently joined 
the Rating Fund in January 2005. The Rating Fund 1 was suspended in 2008 and in 2009 the Rating Fund 2 was launched by 
Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation 
(ADC) in order to fund ratings in the Latin American region. All funded ratings are available online. For further information 
see: http://www.ratingfund2.org/dnn494/EN/Home/tabid/67/Default.aspx. 
25 In the case of mainstream rating agencies a fifth category for cases where insufficient information has been provided 
should be added. But as there were no such cases it can be ignored in this study. In case of Planet Rating the letters D and E 
are both in the forth category. In case of MicroRate and M-Cril and the application of Greek letters β- has been attached to 
the third category although all other β-grades were within the second category. This is due to the fact that MicroRate only 
uses three different letters while looking at the explanation a fourth major category can be established.       28 
   
Data: Rating Fund I 
versus non-co-funded ratings declines. In 
2004  nearly  1/3  of  all  ratings  realized 
within the microfinance sector were co-
funded  while  in  2007  the  proportion 
declined to 1/5 (ADA 2008).  
Still,  comparing  these  rating  grade 
assignments  with  the  results  of  the 
rating  activities  of  one  of  the  mayor 
rating  agencies  specialized  on 
microfinance,  the  percentages  do  not 
vary  too  much  with  slightly  more 
assigned grades in the lowest category. 
In its 2008 activity report, Planet Rating stated that in 2008, 33% of the MFIs rated have received an 
“Investment” grade (from A++ to B), while 50.5% received a “Speculative” grade (from B- to C-) and 16.5% 
were classified as “Technical Assistance Required” (D and E).
26 These numbers do not vary too much 
considering the previous two years (Planet Rating 2009, p.12).  
At this point it is noteworthy that 55 out of 317 MFIs rated within the programme of the Rating Fund I 
were very good performing MFIs and that most of them (49%) are concentrated in two regions: Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia as well as Latin America while most MFIs with very low ratings are based in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
However, more and more MFIs voluntarily choose to receive a rating for the first time, especially in 
regions  with  less  mature  markets  like  Africa  (ADA  2008,  p.  32)  thereby  increasing  transparency  and 
investor’s trust. This might be an indication that in future there will be more (though perhaps not highly 
profitable) MFIs ready to receive funds.  
The legal status of MFIs matters – Microfinance regulation and the transformation of NGOs  
One  aspect  closely  linked  to  the  regulatory framework  is  the  legal  status  an  MFI  can  choose  for  its 
operations. The legal form highly influences the capacity of MFIs to have access to loanable funds as well 
as to equity (Fernando 2004). In 2008 out of 1075 MFIs 36% were non governmental institutions (NGOs), 
31% non bank financial institutions (NBFIs), 17% were credit unions, 7% banks and 7 % rural banks (MIX 
2009). This distribution is similar to the years from 2005 to 2007 (based on the data of 487 MFIs) though 
the percentage for NGOs declined from 45% to 39% and the percentage of NBFIs increased from 29% to 
35% respectively. Two explanations are possible for this shifting: a) changes in the distribution as more 
and more MFIs report to The MIX and b) some NGOs transformed into NBFIs or even banks. 
Since the first transformation of an MFI in 1992 (PRODEM into BancoSol in Bolivia) there have been in 
total 88 MFI transformations into formal financial institutions in 35 countries worldwide (Lauer 2008) until 
the end of 2007 - with increasing tendency. 
Again there is a distinct regional concentration with 31 cases in Latin America, 26 in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 21 in Asia, 8 in Sub-Saharan Africa and only 2 in Middle East and Northern Africa. Even within 
the regions there are strong concentrations e.g. for Latin America there were 10 transformations just in 
                                                           
26 Please note that as Planet Rating is not recognized by any banking supervision authority, the classification of 
„Investment“ and „Speculative“ grades cannot be compared to the same classification of recognized, mainstream rating 
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Data source: Lauer (2008) 
Peru and six in Bolivia . In Asia transforming MFIs were in India (7) while in Sub-Saharan Africa most 
transforming MFIs were in Uganda (4). This concentration is also linked to the legal environment in which 
MFIs operate. For example, in Peru all cases took 
place  between  1999  and  2001  just  after  a  law 
was passed which required NGOs to pay value-
added  tax  on  all  interest  from  loans.  Thus, 
EDPYMEs  as  new  regulated  credit-only 
institutions  were  created.  Most  Peruvian  NGOs 
transformed  into  this  EDPYMEs  (Ebentreich 
2005). In Bolivia one of the driving forces was the 
creation of Private Financial Fund (FFPs) in 1995 
which  allowed  the  MFIs  to  capture  deposits 
(Meagher and al. 2006). In Uganda the need to 
regulate informal NGO with established deposit 
taking  activities  led  to  the  formalisation  of 
Microfinance Deposit-taking Institutions (MDIs) in 
2003 (Fiends Consult 2007) while transformations of the above mentioned MFIs took place in the two 
following years. 
In India, some of the major MFIs (among them SKS Microfinance, Share Microfin, Spandana and Bandhan) 
all  transformed  into  Non  Bank  Financial  Corporations  (NBFCs)  between  2000  and  2007.  These  are 
regulated institutions even though this legal form is not specifically designed for MFIs and there is an 
ongoing discussion about finding an adequate regulatory environment to facilitate the development of 
microfinance  besides  the  governmental  SHG  linking  banking  model  (Srinivasan  2009).  Microfinance 
Institutions are not authorized to capture deposits and taking the legal form of an NBFC helped these for-
profit MFIs to gain access to local commercial funding. The fact that local commercial funding for MFIs is 
available in abundance led to very high levels of MFIs leverage of up to 40% (Srinivasan 2009, p.50) - some 
stakeholders already start to worry about. The average debt to equity ratio of NBFCs of 9% is three times 
higher than the MIX average for non bank financial institutions (MIX 2009). Not surprisingly, the call for 
equity financing rather than debt becomes louder. 
Microfinance  business  environments –  Latin  America  is  the  most  attractive  region  of  Microfinance 
Investments 
In 2009 the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) together with the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) 
the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) launched a 
pilot  study  to  assess  the  microfinance  business  environment  of  55  countries  worldwide.  In  the  two 
previous years similar studies for Latin American and the Caribbean have been published  
Three major categories (with a total of 13 indicators) have been assessed as crucial for a favourable 
development  of  the  microfinance  sector:  1)  the  regulatory  framework  (regulation  of  microfinance 
operations, formation and operations of regulated/supervised specialized MFIs, formation and operation 
of non-regulated MFIs, regulatory and examination capacity), 2) the institutional development of the 
microfinance industry (range of MFI services, credit bureaus, level of competition) and 3) the investment 
climate  (political  stability,  capital  market  stability,  judicial  system,  accounting  standards,  governance 
standards, MFI transparency) (EIU 2009). For each indicator a score from 0 to 4 has been assigned with 4 
being the best and 0 the worst score. The indicators were then normalized so that each country is scored 
on  a  scale  between 0  and  100.  Even  though  this  study  has  important  shortcomings  (  firstly,  due  to       30 
   
difficulties  to  secure  sufficient  and  high  quality  data  on  such  a  broad  range  and  secondly  as  Latin 
American countries are over-represented) it still gives a valuable overview about the global distribution of 
favourable microfinance markets 
Regarding regional strength and weaknesses Sub-Saharan Africa has been ranked highest for the legal and 
regulatory framework as a result of regulators’ openness to introducing microfinance specific laws and 
regulations. Still, considering single countries the best scores (top ten) have been reached by countries 
from all the continents headed by two South-East-Asian countries
27 . Regarding the investment climate 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia is the strongest region closely followed by Latin America
28. As for the 
institutional development the majority of highly developed institutions are in the South Asian region 
which has be attributed to its pioneering role in microfinance
29 again closely followed by Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
Regarding the overall score Latin America and the Caribbean is still the most favourable region which is in 
line with the analysis of MFIs performance in the precious passages. Even more interesting is the overall 
score of single countries. The ten countries with the most favourable business environments are: Peru, 
Bolivia,  Philippines,  India,  Ghana,  Ecuador,  Nicaragua,  Colombia,  El  Salvador  and  Uganda.  This 
corresponds to the fact that Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua are among the top ten countries of the 
Dexia Microcredit Fund, ResponsAbility Global Microfiance Fund, Oikocredit, BOLD 1, BOMS 1. In addition, 
India is most important country for the Dexia Microcredit Fund and Oikocredit (Blue Orchard 2010a; Blue 
Orchard 2010b; Credit Suisse 2010; Oikocredit 2010).  
MIVs do not fear a lack of investees; pension funds see it as the major constraint 
 
Accordingly, the majority of asset managers of MIVs believe that there is not anymore a lack of investees. 
In addition, due to new investment products the small deal size of microfinance investments is not seen 
any more as a major obstacle. The issue has been overcome (38%) or is only a minor obstacle (46%). The 
development of the microfinance sector towards a sustainable industry is clearly identified as a barrier 
that  has  been  overcome  (46%  of  respondents  support  this).  Yet,  a  considerable  percentage  of 
respondents identify the lack of investment opportunities in sustainable MFIs still as a minor (25%) or as 
an important (25%) obstacle. Notably no participant thinks this will be an important barrier in the future.  
Transparency  in  this  relatively  new  sector  is  of  main  importance  to  identify  potential  investment 
opportunities. The issue seems to be mainly overcome, according to the survey results. Participants do 
not make a difference between transparency at the industry level and transparency at the MFI level, both 
are viewed as minor obstacles (by 46%) or as barriers that have been overcome (by 25% of participants). 
This  might  be  the  result  of  increasing  transparency  set  forth  by  CGAP,  the  MIX  Market  as  well  as 
specialized microfinance ratings agencies. Nevertheless, one should note that this represents the MIV 
view. Easy and accessible information might not be available to primary investors. One survey participant 
added the issue “transparency at the MIV level”, which would have been interesting to include in the 
survey as well.  
                                                           
27 The top ten countries for their regulatory framework are: Cambodia, Philippines, Bolivia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Peru, Ghana, 
Pakistan and Uganda. 
28 The top ten countries for their institutional development are: Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, India, Nicaragua, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and the Philippines. The top ten countries for their investment climate are: Chile, Turkey, 
Bosnia, Morocco, Panama, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Ghana. 
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However,  looking  at  the  conditions  for  the  development  of  the  market  size,  the  survey  participants 
identify further issues: State intervention distorting the competition is seen as an important obstacle by 
41%  of  the  participants.  Only  4%  thinks  this  has  been  overcome.  The  same  applies  to  the  barriers 
regarding local market regulation and the supervisory framework in target countries: While 4% think this 
is not an issue anymore, 38% (29% respectively) are convinced that it is hindering investments. 
Whereas MIV managers still seem to see a high market potential, pension funds identify market size as 
one of the major constraints for further investments. The second most cited concern of pension funds is 
the  “limited  size  of  the  microfinance  market  and  its  limited  capability  to  absorb  large  investments”  
(World Microfinance Forum Geneva 2009, p.6). 
4   Investments in Highly Developed Microfinance Markets – Insights from Peru 
In this last section we now turn to the case of Peru in order to further underpin certain arguments 
developed  in  the  previous  sections.  As  mentioned  before,  Peru  is  one  of  the  most  attractive 
countries for microfinance investments. 
Peru is characterized by a very good regulatory and investment environment 
In its “Microscope 2008” issue dedicated solely to the region Latin America and the Caribbean, the EIU 
characterised Peru as the country with the most microfinance-friendly environment in Latin America (EIU 
2008a).  The  regulatory  framework  was  weighted  with  40%  of  the  overall  score,  the  institutional 
development of the microfinance industry with another 40% and the investment climate with 20% (EIU 
2008b). Especially the very high score when evaluating the regulatory environment, which placed Peru in 
the same position as Bolivia, was highlighted. Already in 2005 Peru was rated high by the World Bank- IMF 
Financial  Sector  Assessment  Program  due  to  the  good  reputation  of  Peru’s  principal  regulator 
(Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros, SBS). Microfinance specific regulations have been developed, 
such as loan-loss provisioning based on loan status rather than institutional type. Furthermore, stringent 
requirements for internal MFIs controls and on-site inspection procedures have been increasingly applied 
(Ebentreich 2005). The adoption by SBS of the Legislative Decree 1028 in June 2008 aims at facilitating the 
access of regulated MFIs to local capital markets and enables non-bank MFIs to engage in a series of 
financial operations previously restricted to banks (e.g. trading stocks and bonds) (EIU 2008a, p.48). 
The latter also influences the raise of Peru’s investment climate. In this category also broader indicators, 
not necessarily related to microfinance are assessed. The relative high score which places Peru in the 5
th 
position of all Latin American countries is also supported by the raise of Peru’s sovereign rating of two 
major rating agencies to the investment grade category in 2008 due to the countries decline in fiscal and 
external  vulnerabilities  (Lesova  2008b).  Especially  the  first  upgrade  by  Fitch  in  April  2008  created 
enthusiasm among financiers as the stock market was expected to boost, private investment to increase 
while Peru’s financial channels were supposed to improve (Lesova 2008a).  
Also taking a look at some of the largest MIVs confirms the important role Peru plays for investors: Since 
its inception in 2004, the ResponsAbility Global Microfinance Fund has invested the largest portion of its 
capital in Peru. For Oikocredit Peru is the third most important country in terms of outstanding portfolio. 
Regarding the portfolio of BOMS 1, BOLD 1 and the Dexia Microcredit Fund, managed by Blue Orchard, 
Peru  is  among  the  top  ten  countries  (Blue  Orchard  2010a;  Blue  Orchard  2010b;  Credit  Suisse  2010; 
Oikocredit 2010).        32 
   
As for the institutional development of the microfinance industry, Peru is placed 3
rd right after Ecuador 
and Bolivia. According to COPEME (2009) in June 2009 there were 39 regulated financial institutions 
dedicated to microfinance: 1 bank (MiBanco), 2 finance companies (Edyficar and CredScotia), 13 Cajas 
Municipales de Ahorro y Crédito (CMACs), 10 Cajas Rurales (CRACs) and 13 Entidades de Desarrollo de la 
Pequeña y Microempresa (EDPYMEs). Furthermore there are 161 cooperatives (out of which 8 have an 
important  orientation  towards  microfinance)  and  16  NGOs  offering  microfinance  services.  Since  two 
EDPYMEs transformed into finance companies (financieras) in the course of 2009 (Crear and Confianza) at 
present there are 4 finance companies and 11 EDPYMEs. 
There is a distinct concentration of assets deployed in the microfinance sector 
The difference of the various legal forms concerns primarily the product range the institutions are allowed 
to  offer.  Especially  the  allowance  to  offer  savings  products  is  reserved  to  banks,  finance  companies, 
CMACs and CRACs and cooperatives while EDPYMEs and NGOs are credit-only institutions. But also the 
sizes of the institutions differ considerably. In 2008, 60 MFIs reported to The MIX, and the microfinance 
bank MiBanco can be clearly identified as the individual market leader on a national scale with 20% of 
total assets in the sector. The group or CMACs held 45% of total assets, yet, with significant differences 
between one CMAC and another. Four CMACs (Piura, Trujillo, Arequipa and Sullana) held 64% of total 
assets within this group. Therefore it was mentioned by different stakeholders that MiBanco was indeed 
the national market leader but CMACs often held the first position within their respective region. In 2008 
CMACs were allowed to operate on a national scale for the first time and some of them hope to gain 
market share at a national scale in the near future. Another important player in the microfinance industry 
is  Crediscotia  which  was  created  when  Scotiabank  bought  Banco  del  Trabajo  in  July  2008  within  its 
downscaling strategy to attend the microfinance segment. Furthermore, in 2009 Banco del Crédito bought 
EDPYME  Edyficar  –  the  leading  institution  within  this  sub-group  –  and  converted  it  into  Financiera 
Edyficar. The following table provides an overview about the market shares by institution type and further 
details for the most important MFIs: 
  % of Total Assets  % of Active Borrowers  % of Deposits 
MiBanco  19.94%  19.94%  14.39%  14.39%  21.74%  21.74% 









Financiera Edyficar  4.65%  6.83%  0.22% 
Rest Financieras  3.62%  8.82%  0.00% 









CMAC Piura  8.11%  4.67%  10.60% 
CMAC Sullana  4.78%  2.84%  5.86% 
CMAC Trujillo  8.01%  4.65%  9.81% 
Rest CMACs  16.14%  11.58%  19.44% 
CRACs  6.85%  6.85%  6.04%  6.04%  7.52%  7.52% 
EDPYMEs  5.31%  5.31%  9.94%  9.94%  0.00%  0.00% 
COOPACs  3.56%  3.56%  3.32%  3.32%  4.04%  4.04% 
NGOs  1.98%  1.98%  6.64%  6.64%  0.00%  0.00% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
                Source: The Mix, own elaboration 
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A specific feature in the Peruvian microfinance market compared to many other countries is that deposits 
account for an important funding source for major MFIs. While the worlds average of the ratio of deposits 
to outstanding loans is 46% (Chen, Rasmusen et al. 2010, p.3) in Peru it is 67%. Especially the CMACs – 
based on the business model of German savings banks – keep this percentage high. The biggest CMAC 
(Piura) has a ratio of deposits to outstanding loans of 90%. But also MiBanco as the largest MFI has a ratio 
of 74%. This has also consequences regarding the willingness to absorb international investments under 
given conditions. 
Funding through local capital markets of major MFIs will increase 
Taking MiBanco for instance, the most important lenders are bilateral public entities (IFC, Instituto de 
Crédito Oficial de España, FMO) with 79% of outstanding borrowings by the end of 2008 (Ernst&Young 
2009). The duration of these loans are up to 10 years (IFC and Instituto Nacial de Credito de España). This 
level of maturity was only offered by one of the private international MIVs (Triodos Fair Share Fund). 
MiBanco furthermore received loans from international commercial banks with durations between one 
and two years. While the costs of these funds were not disclosed, the interest rates applied for national 
funds (of development banks as well as commercial banks) varied between 6.15% and 9.65%. In order to 
diversify the sources of funding, an increasingly used instrument is also the issuance of corporate bonds. 
MiBanco issued its first bonds in 2005 with a total value of 30 Mio. Nuevos Soles (~ USD 9.5 million 
30) 
followed  by  three  more  issuances  until  2009  of  the  same  amount.  The  interest  rate  of  these  bond 
issuances varied from 5.94% to 7.38%, thus the interest rate is up to 2% lower than for national debt. 
Funding through bonds can be much cheaper especially with medium-term maturities (here between 2 
and 4 years) as exemplified by Financiera Edyficar. The average interest rates of bonds placed at the local 
stock market was 7% (for 2 years) while the interest rate for important borrowings from international 
MIVs  varied  mostly  between  8%  and 10%  while  the highest  interest  rate (due  in  2015) was  12.85% 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2009). 
Crediscotia  received  its  first  allowance  for  bond  issuance  in  2008  and  placed  those  in  2009.  CMAC 
Arequipa got the allowance to place deposit certificates with a maturity of one year in 2009 and is now 
waiting for a good moment for the issuance. Other CMACs plan to issue deposit certificates in the long 
run as well. According to representatives from CONASEV – the regulatory body for stock exchange – the 
local capital market is welcoming new investment opportunities and they expect more and more MFIs to 
follow these examples. Refinancing through local capital markets is also envisaged by at least one of the 
lately transformed financieras. Two major advantages are considered to be linked to refinancing through 
local  capital  markets.  First  of  all,  international  debt  often  contains  an  exchange  risk  which  can  be 
mitigated with a stronger reliance on local markets. Secondly, local capital is cheaper than international 
debt and often cheaper than deposit taking. 
MFIs are searching for a suitable refinancing mix. The significance of deposit taking will increase 
Taking the CMAC Arequipa as an example the interest rates for deposits vary between 1.20% and 12.00% 
(JAU 2009, p.22). While interest rates for demand deposits (ahorros) are usually very low, the interest 
rates for fixed deposits (depósitos a plazo) are high. The majority of deposits (~85% by end of 2008) are 
fixed deposits. Long-term fixed deposits of over one year even reach share of 13%, for which the highest 
interest rates usually has to be paid. Therefore, it was stated that for CMAC Arequipa the right funding 
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mix  was  crucial  for  the  future  development.  Still,  it  was  stressed  that  the  deposit  ratio  should  not 
decrease. Instead, measures will have to be taken to bring down the interest rates for fixed deposits The 
reason mentioned by one of the MFIs for relatively high interest rates compared to commercial banks was 
the relatively higher risk as perceived by depositors to hold their deposits with an MFI. The latter is also 
reflected through the lower credit risk ratings of the four rating agencies recognized by the Peruvian 
authorities. For example, in 2006 the highest grade reached within the subgroup of CMACs was B+ (Piura, 
Trujillo, Arequipa). The worst grade received by a bank was A- (Banco Financiero) while most of the banks 
reached A (e.g.Citibank, COFIDE, Internbank and MiBanco) or the highest grade A+ (Banco de Crédito, 
BBVA Banco Continental).
31 This becomes especially important concerning institutional depositors (e.g. 
local governmental organisations). Furthermore it was stressed that higher interest has to be paid also 
due to the limited product range the CMAC Arequipa is still offering in order to hold clients with more 
sophisticated financing needs. Therefore the CMACs would have to broaden their product range and also 
offer factoring and leasing for example. 
However, unlike the CMACs which also (if not mostly) serve relatively better-off depositors the newly 
transformed financieras target mainly their current clientele – most of them individual small-scale savers. 
In these cases the refinancing costs are expected to sink considerably. But not only might the costs 
decrease due to interest payments. In December 2008 EDPYME Crear Arequipa (now Financiera Crear) 
had  investment  relationships  with  6  national  investors  (commercial  banks  and  governmental 
development entities/funds) and 14 different international investors (19 if 2007 is considered as well). 
The average outstanding debt balance from international investors was 13,866,000 Nuevos Soles (~ USD 
4.5 million) with a maximum amount of 15,860,000 Nuevos Soles (~ USD 5 million). The interest rate for 
international debt mostly varied between 9% and 11%. Searching, setting up, monitoring and reporting 
about so many different financing relationships also imply high transaction costs for an MFI. In case that 
the application of funds is earmarked – as it is often the case for MIVs – the obligations of documentation 
and thus transaction costs further increase. 
Besides the lowering of funding costs, the motive to offer savings products to their clients for the two 
newly transformed financieras was also to offer a wider product range as a precondition to satisfy clients’ 
needs  and  thus  stay  competitive.  Financiera  Confianza  even  plans  to  further  transform  into  a  bank. 
However, it was mentioned that strong alliances, mergers and/or the entrance of strong shareholders (as 
happened with EDPYME Edyficar) were necessary for the next steps. At least one other EDPYME stated 
that it had plans to transform into financiera in the midium-term and it seems likely that others will follow 
the examples in the long run. 
Microfinance NGOs depend mostly on international investments. Still, sums in absolute terms a rather 
small 
NGOs instead seemed mostly resilient to transformation. Only one NGO mentioned that it planned to 
transform into EDPYME and further into financiera in the long-run. Still, a precondition would be that 
shareholders with clear social objectives could be found. NGOs fear of mission drift when converting into 
a for-profit entity seemed high. Some of the NGO-MFIs are part of a bigger development NGO (e.g. ADRA 
Peru  and  Manuela  Ramos).  They  stated  that  even  if self-sustainability  was  very  important  for  them, 
becoming a leading microfinance institution at a national scale was not part of their vision. The latter was 
instead  envisaged  by  most  of  the  financieras,  CMACs,  CRACs  and  EDPYMEs.  Regarding  their  funding 
                                                           
31 A database with the rating grades from 2000 to 2006 obtained by financial institutions was provided by SBS.       35 
   
Source: The MIX, based on the data of 38 MFIs 
sources, NGOs very much depended on international investments. For example, the Cusco-based NGO 
Asociación Arariwa refinanced itself with a percentage of 91% through international MIVs with an average 
interest rate of 8.6% (Alfonso Munoz & Asociados 2009, p.17). In comparison, only 6% of the liabilities of 
CMAC Arequipa were compound of international debt (JAU 2009, p.3,24) with an average interest rate of 
6.5%.  Still,  in  absolute  terms,  the  sum  of  international  debt  was  almost  four  times  higher  than  for 
Asociación Arariwa (15.5 Mio Nuevos Soles versus 60 Mio Nuevos Soles; ~ USD 5.4 million versus ~ USD 21 
million). Asociación Arariwa was with 9.1% of total assets of all NGOs in the fifth place within this sub-
group. 
National banks start to serve as second tier lenders 
Another funding source which will gain importance in the future is debt financing through local banks. In 
2006 a revolving fund of 200 Mio. Nuevos Soles was set up by the state-owned bank Banco de la Nación 
to support micro entrepreneurs through MFIs. Currently Banco de la Nación works with 22 regulated MFIs 
and discussions on raising the funding resources have already begun. 
At the same time, the Banco de Crédito has established credit lines with several MFIs even though a 
guarantee of 100% is still necessary to qualify. Thus, Banco de Crédito transfers the credit risk to a third 
party.  However,  as  the  microfinance  sector  gains  importance  and  recognition  as  a  sustainable  and 
profitable business and as traditional business segments of commercial banks turn out to be less and less 
profitable  Banco  de  Crédito  already  started  internal  discussions  on  loosening  these  strict  guarantee 
policies. 
Increasing competition makes a consolidation of the microfinance sector necessary 
An increasing interest of commercial banks in microfinance is also indicated by a) the acquisition of 
specialized  MFIs  (Crediscotia  and 
EDPYME  Edificar  and  b)  their  direct 
entrance  into  microfinance,  mostly  the 
SME  segment.  The  result  is  an  ongoing 
commercialisation  and  an  increasing 
competition  within  the  microfinance 
sector.  The  allowance  for  CMACs  to 
operate on a national scale furthermore 
increased competition especially in highly 
developed  microfinance  regions.  As  a 
result the problem of cross-indebtedness 
of clients appeared. While Peru did not 
suffer too much with the global economic crisis some MFIs still stated that clients were indeed affected 
and  thus,  portfolio  quality  worsened.  Still,  it  was  highlighted  that  the  first  reason  for  portfolio 
deterioration especially within the course of 2008 was the practice of multiple borrowing and increasing 
indebtedness among microfinance clients. 
As a consequence many MFIs pointed out, that ambitious growth rate regarding microfinance clients and 
loan portfolio had to be corrected. In May 2010 CGAP claimed that between 2004 and 2008, the average 
compounded growth rate of MFIs reporting to The Mix was 43% (Latorture 2010). Portfolio growth of 
Peruvian MFIs reached these levels in 2006 and 2007, while in 2008 growth started to slow down. In 2009 
the compounded growth rate of gross loan portfolio was 22% (based on the data of 38 MFIs).       36 
   
Source: The MIX, based on the data of 38 MFIs 
While  all  MFIs  felt  the  effects  of 
increasing  competition,  especially 
the regulated entities stated that a 
consolidation  within  the 
microfinance  sector  was 
necessary. This will not only result 
in lower growth rates but also in 
the  creation  of  strategic  alliances 
and mergers between MFIs or the 
further  acquisition  of  smaller 
entities  by  bigger  players. 
Furthermore  some  MFIs  try  to 
adjust  to  the  changing 
environment by “mainstreaming” their management. For example, two of the interviewed MFIs hired 
upper management members from the commercial banking sector in 2009 and 2010. However, proper 
staffing on lower levels was a still problem – especially for CMACs as public entities where 100% of share 
capital is in the hands of the respective community. It was mentioned, that MFIs often could not pay 
competitive salaries and that trained staff was enticed away by commercial banks. 
Product diversification and rural outreach are seen as the answers to increasing competition. 
Finally, MFIs also stated that they had to further diversify their product range as well as enter into new 
market segments. Offering savings products was seen by some MFIs as a client retention mechanism as 
well as a mean to ensure that clients repay their loans. Clients with credit at various institutions were 
expected to pay back first to those MFIs they saved with. But also reaching out into untapped markets – 
mainly in rural areas – was mentioned as important in order to ensure future growth. However, most of 
the regulated for-profit MFIs avoid actual agriculture finance as it is seen as little profitable and extremely 
risky. The latter is also due to the absence of proper insurance mechanisms already available in other 
parts of the world (such as index based crop insurance) as well as due to the regional concentration of 
many MFIs. For example, in early 2010 one of the NGOs suffered heavy losses because of flooding in the 
area of Cusco. Furthermore, Peru is periodically hit by El Niño, which makes such losses more probable 
also in the coastal regions. In the early 2000s many CRACs suffered heavy losses in their rural portfolio 
and consequently withdrew from these markets in the following years. 
Still,  MFIs  plan  to  achieve  outreach  starting  with  targeting  entrepreneurs  who  (partly)  dedicate 
themselves to the breeding of small animals (e.g. guinea pigs). In order to ensure efficiency while reaching 
out to more marginalised costumers, one CMAC in 2009 even introduced group lending mechanisms – 
though traditionally CMACs only offer individual loans. However, only one MFI stated to have clearly 
defined  strategic  objectives  towards  agricultural  finance.  In  2008  the  Spanish  foundation  BBVA 
Microfinanzas bought three MFIs (Caja Rural de Ahorro y Crédito Nor Perú, la Caja Rural de Ahorro y 
Crédito del Sur, y Edpyme Crear Tacna) and created the CRAC Nuestra Gente. By end 2008 CRAC Nuestra 
Gente hold 3.4% of total assets of the sector while BBVA was with 96.7% the major shareholder. As part of 
the  policies  of  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  of  the  bank  BBVA  the  foundation  aims  at  increasing 
outreach majorly through agricultural finance and instructed the management of CRAC Nuestra Gente to 
create an integrated approach of financing and production promotion. Since then CRAC Nuestra Gente 
cooperates with other organizations in the field of agricultural production. However no short-term profits       37 
   
are expected from this business line even though the self-sustainability of the overall institution should 
not be in peril. 
 
5   Conclusion 
As the microfinance industry matured, the commercial approach became widely accepted, more and 
more microfinance institutions (MFIs) became self-sustainable and the transparency within the sector 
increased  considerably.  Accordingly,  investments  in  microfinance  especially  of  private  Microfinance 
Investment Vehicles driven foremost by private investors grew at a significant scale in the last five years. 
Returns of MIVs reached moderate, but acceptable levels compared to standard money market indices, 
showing low volatility so far. Moreover, in past economic crises in Asia and Latin America MFIs appeared 
to be less vulnerable to market risks than commercial banks or other large industries. Also in the current 
economic crisis many MFIs continue to grow even though at lower rates. Bankruptcies of MFIs are rare in 
general and no case is known for being caused explicitly by the economic crisis. Thus, microfinance shows 
to  be  an  attractive  anti-cyclical  investment  opportunity  for  portfolio  diversification.  First  efforts  to 
benchmark microfinance investments with other asset classes – as a precondition for being recognized by 
mainstream investors – have been made. Also, further steps towards increasing professionalism among 
MIVs can be observed making use of structured finance mechanisms since 2004 and registered mutual 
funds which might help mainstream investors to better cope with risks linked to microfinance, especially 
in regard to investments beyond corporate social responsibility strategies. The MIVs offer investors to 
enter the market with larger volumes. The general increasing demand for socially responsible investments 
might also help to lift microfinance into a position of broader recognition. Thus, there are many indicators 
in favor of microfinance converting into a mainstream asset class. 
However, microfinance as a social investment not only creates new opportunities: Threats and upcoming 
debates on irresponsible business practices, mission drift and limited impact reveal the vulnerability of 
the industry’s reputation. And reputation is seen incrementally as a valuable and highly prized asset. This 
especially  applies  to  social  investments.  Efforts  to  find  common  social  standards  and  to  increase 
transparency in this field are increasingly on the rise but they are not yet sufficiently developed. As 
microfinance  is  competing  with  other  socially,  ethically  or  environmentally  friendly  investment 
opportunities this could turn out to be a race against time. Furthermore, the options for mainstream 
microfinance investors are still limited, as investments are highly concentrated on the five largest MIVs. 
This is also related to the regulation of primary countries where changes are needed  to allow the set up 
and public distribution of mutual funds. There is still much uncertainty about risk profiles for the financial 
performance of MFIs and it seems that specific risks linked to microfinance have been underestimated in 
the past. A high concentration of investments at a country level exists, which also increases the exposure 
to systematic (market) risks, a fact some mainstream investors might be little aware of at present. The 
concentration  on  the  country  level  also  increases  the  exposure  to  the  systemic  risks  specific  to 
microfinance, which has been revealed by the current crisis of over-indebtedness in four countries. The 
market concentration is also high regarding the investees: Although there are many (sustainable) MFIs in 
absolute terms, the number of MFIs with attractive portfolio sizes and promising high returns is limited, 
reducing the possibility for MIVs to invest in a variety of different MFIs. Regarding the development of the 
number of countries and MFIs ready to absorb investments it can be observed that changes in countries’ 
regulatory framework and business environment as well as internal processes of MFIs to become more 
professional are costly and longsome. This is unlikely to change in the future which makes it difficult for       38 
   
MIVs to substantially increase the number of countries in their portfolio and which is hindering high 
number of MFIs to rapidly grow and thus become potential investees for large investment sizes.  .  
The limitations for further high growth rate of microfinance investments have been shown with the case 
of Peru: In Peru, an example of a more developed microfinance market – which are at the same time the 
most attractive ones for investors – the need for consolidation and the search for ways to enter into new 
market segments has been identified and growth plans have been corrected downwards. At the same 
time,  local  investments  are  gaining  importance  especially  deposits  but  also  refinancing  through  local 
capital markets and increasingly through interbank lending – at least for the case of Peru. This fact, as well 
as the increasing competition between MIVs, might lead to decreasing returns. MIVs might be forced to 
invest in less profitable and smaller MFIs and operational costs might increase. The increasing need of 
equity rather than debt will force investors to assume higher risks especially as trade of MFI shares at 
stock markets is still underdeveloped.  
These findings paint a rather ambiguous picture in favor and against the development of microfinance 
into a mainstream asset class – at least in the near future. Regarding the investor side, the performance 
during the current crisis will be a test, crucial for the entrance of increased mainstream investments. In 
addition,  further  research  is  needed  concerning  the  specific  risks  of  microfinance  as  well  as  the 
competiveness of MIV investments compared to other upcoming funding options for MFIs. The prospects 
for the evolvement of new profitable or sustainable large MFIs seem rather bad, which limits investment 
opportunities  in  a  highly  concentrated  market.  Hence,  CGAP’s  rather  intuitive  argumentation  seems 
plausible that “MIVs may need new investment approaches, such as expanding to new markets (e.g. 
Africa and Asia), funding in local currency, taking equity positions, or reaching beyond the top tier MFIs.” 
(CGAP 2010). 
Regarding  the  impact  of  international  microfinance  investments  on  MFIs  and  their  clients  it  will  be 
interesting to see if MFIs can translate increasing resources into a primary access to financial services for 
unbanked clients – including the ones in remote, rural areas – or if the competition among MFIs for 
existing  clients  will  further  intensify.  Increasing  outreach  of  the  sector  versus  increasing  (over-) 
indebtedness of clients would be the simplified extremes – with far-reaching consequences. As it is a high 
challenge for MFIs to quickly increase the client base in untapped, e.g. rural areas,   it will be crucial for 
microfinance investments that the number of potential investees increases and MIVs reach beyond the 
“investment darlings”. If a considerable number of “next generation” Tier 2  / Tier 3 MFIs graduates to 
Tier 1 MFIs and achieves to attract mainstream investment, MIVs will have more investment options and 
better growth prospects, hence attract more mainstream capital, while the supply of financial services to 
the  poor  could  be  substantially  increased.  On  the  other  hand,  if  microfinance  fails  to  become  a 
mainstream asset class, many MFIs might stay depended on donor money with limited outreach. Others 
might further discover client’s savings as a viable funding base. The latter – though at a slower pace – 
would not only offer MFIs to tap a more stable finance source but also provide solutions  to urgent 
financial needs of the poor. The lessons learned from the current and future economic downturns may 
reveal if this does not turn out to be an even more attractive option for MFIs and their clients. 
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